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Abstract 
 
Sun Zi’s Art  of  War is the oldest military treatise in the world and still the most 
relevant. It can be applied to any area of human experience that involves conflict of some 
sort and has been applied to a variety of problems by everyday practitioners and academic 
scholars alike. Despite its importance, it is mostly ignored by the social scientific 
community at large. In an attempt to rectify this situation, I examine the Art of War as data 
from  a  sociological  perspective,  namely,  that  of  Cultural  Theory,  which  is  used  to  
comprehend sociocultural reality. Furthermore, I invert what might be an ‘intellectually 
imperialist’ relationship and examine Cultural Theory from the perspective of the Sun Zi. 
The overall goal is to discover how their mutual interaction might be utilized by scholars in 
studies of the Sun Zi,  Cultural  Theory,  and  related  topics  as  well  as  how  it  might  allow  
people to view how they live differently. The results of these close readings demonstrate 
that the Art  of  War is rooted in two intertwining cultures, the hierarchic and the 
individualist—the better for a general to manipulate his enemy and emerge victorious in 
battle. Cultural Theory, on the other hand, can be fruitfully applied to the issues that 
concern the Art of War such as knowing one’s enemy and deception, and, thus, used to win. 
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1 Introduction  
Over 2,500 years old Sun Zi’s Art of War is recognized as the earliest extant of all 
military classics. It is also recognized by many experts as the most eminent of military 
treatises whose extensive influence is impossible to estimate. From its origins in the second 
half of the Era of Warring States (c. 475 to 221 B.C.) to the current military doctrine of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Art of War has been the foremost military manual in 
Chinese history. Since its introduction to Japan, it has also been essential to the history of 
Japanese military thought, adopted and adapted by both shoguns like Tokugawa Ieyasu and 
swordsmen  like  Musashi  Miyamoto  alike.  In  1772  J.  J.  M.  Amiot,  one  of  the  first  Jesuit  
priests to visit China, translated the Art  of  War into French. It is rumored that both 
Napoleon and the Nazi high command sat at Sun Zi’s feet. While this is highly unlikely, it 
is known that Finnish field marshal (and later president) Mannerheim and his second-in-
command lieutenant general Airo, successful military leaders in two wars against the Soviet 
Union, were both avid readers of this translation. The Sun Zi’s principles were also utilized 
by Ho Chi Minh and his generals in their defeat of both the French and later the Americans. 
While the Art of War was first translated into English in 1905 and influenced strategists 
such as British captain B. H. Liddell Hart, it took their loss to the Vietcong for the United 
States military to take the Art of War seriously. They eventually made it a mandatory part 
of  the  curricula  for  all  branches  of  the  military  such  as  on  the  Marine  Corps'  
“Commandant’s Reading List”. Its reach does not end with the military community, 
however, for it has made its way from being elite military knowledge to becoming a part of 
popular culture. 
There are over 250 books in English alone on the Art of War many of which are 
written to be applied to non-military fields from Japanese corporate strategy to dating. 
There are websites devoted to the Sun Zi such as Sonshi.com which is endorsed by 
recognized specialists and hosts a forum where everyday practitioners can discuss the 
modern applicability of Sun Zi’s military theory. The Art of War’s title is used in movies, 
its sayings appear in hip hop songs, and its strategic designs are applied to different sports 
worldwide. There are also a number of academic articles1 from a wide array of disciplines 
                                               
1 See Dimovski, et al. (2012) for an impressive reference list of books and articles. 
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seeding the Sun Zi’s ideas in their fields. Some are not so surprising such as its use in many 
varieties of management science, while others are more surprising like its application to 
construction  work.  Sun  Zi’s  principles  are  even  taught  in  university  courses  such  as  
“Operator Businesses in Telecommunication Networks” at Aalto University in Finland. On 
the whole, there seems to be a place in modern society for Sun Zi’s counsel.  
The Art of War offers advice for every sort of conflict that humans can experience. 
According to its pages, one must know one’s opponent and know one’s self. The work 
proposes a way to perceive an opponent and deceive them so what they perceive is what 
one wants them to perceive. Deception is not the goal in and of itself but, rather, the 
surprise that comes when one strikes unexpectedly at an opponent’s weakest point bringing 
about their complete capitulation. Ideally, this should be done without any fighting at all. At 
the very least, victory should be achieved with the minimal amount of effort (including 
violence, as in the context of war) and resources. It also teaches one to remain flexible 
when reality fluctuates as it is prone to do because, on top of the uncertainty of one’s 
knowledge, one’s opponents are most likely using deception as well. Overall, the Sun Zi 
can be seen as a method for dealing with the complexity of contemporary life so that one 
could make prompt decisions and take effective action. Even with its growing relevance, 
there have been little to no attempts made, either in popular or academic works, to 
comprehend the inner workings of the Art of War from a sociological standpoint.  
The lack of attention to the treatise from the sociological community, never mind 
from the social scientific community at large, becomes an opportunity for me to examine an 
important classic from a much needed perspective. This is what makes the approach taken 
in this paper so distinctive. While it is so that sociological concepts and theories are just 
metaphors and models of social reality and cannot fully account for its complexity, they can 
be powerful heuristic devices or ways to transform people’s perspectives so that they can 
discover something new about the way they live. Enter ‘Cultural Theory’.  
Cultural Theory (CT), first developed by British anthropologist and sociological 
thinker Mary Douglas then furthered by her followers, has also been applied widely from 
political science to policy-making. The theory is grounded in the foundational thought of 
sociologist Émile Durkheim but also draws from several other notable anthropological and 
sociological thinkers. Cultural Theory proposes that there are at minimum four (or even 
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five) ways of life or ‘cultures’ (not to be confused with languages, nationalities or 
ethnicities) each with their own rationality. Each culture bounds everything its adherents 
think they know, thus, everything they believe. In this context, ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ are 
social and cultural phenomena, which act as constraints for people’s choices and actions. 
People’s choices and actions, in turn, further reinforce the cultural boundaries and 
perpetuate their respective social systems. Shocks to the system in the form of surprising 
events, manipulation from others, and so on can bring about change but only from one of 
the  cultures  to  another.  In  any  given  society,  regardless  of  the  time or  place,  all  four  (or  
five) cultures are present to different degrees and in shifting alliances as each culture vies 
for dominance over the others. If social reality is as Cultural Theory portrays it, then what 
culture or alliance of cultures is the Art of War entrenched? It  is  in this way that  Cultural  
Theory can prompt a sociological reading of the ancient Chinese military masterpiece. 
Even so, it may seem obvious that, because it is a military treatise, that the Sun Zi 
would directly or indirectly promote a hierarchical culture (the military being the 
hierarchical way of life par excellence), but that is not necessarily the case. At least that is 
not only the case. It seems that the Art of War stems  from  an  alliance  of  two  cultures  
represented traditionally in sociology by the ‘hierarchy’ and the ‘market’. On its own such 
a finding might just be a sociological curiosity and, even, yet another form of Western 
‘intellectual imperialism’. What this finding suggests, though, is that while the Art of War 
is composed and compiled by different authors over several decades and ‘loosely cobbled’ 
together as a consequence, it is cemented together by a unified (albeit, hybridized) culture. 
Furthermore, it is done so, in effect, to generate a general that knows how to manipulate the 
enemy and win battles. Inquiry should not and does not stop there, though. Inverting the 
prior relationship between Cultural Theory and the Art of War as well  prompts a Sun Zi-
inspired reading of Cultural Theory. This reveals how one could feasibly utilize cultural 
biases, or what people believe based on their way of life, to emerge victorious in a contest. 
Taken together, these findings can be both interesting and advantageous for the sociologist, 
the cultural theorist, the scholar and the practitioner of the Sun Zi alike. 
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1.1 Research questions  
 As I stated above my first research question is derived from reading the Art of War 
through the lens of Cultural Theory. “What kind of culture does the Art of War advance?” 
The second research question is derived from reading Cultural Theory through the lens of 
the Art of War. “How can cultural biases be used to emerge victorious in a conflict?” 
1.2 Structure of the paper 
 The precise nature of how I go about answering my research questions in this paper 
is not a straightforward process, and it is not meant to be. The process involves an 
alternation between the ‘data’, in this case, the Art of War and the ‘theory’, in this case, 
Cultural Theory. The goal is to induce ‘abductive reasoning’ which can help me discover or 
invent a novel approach (or approaches) to the Art of War,  Cultural  Theory,  and  their  
possible applications. I designed the paper to reconstruct this process within the parameters 
of a master’s thesis. While all of the conventional sections of a research paper such as the 
‘introduction’, the ‘literature review’, ‘method’, ‘results’ and ‘discussion’ are included, 
they are not arranged in the ‘usual’ format. Instead, in Section 2, I present my 
‘methodology’ or the underlying logic which runs through this specific research process. It 
is based on C. Wright Mills “intellectual craftsmanship”, an admittedly atypical choice for 
a methodology. This section also includes what abductive reasoning is and how it is (and 
can be) utilized in social scientific research. In Section 3, I introduce Sun Zi, the Art of 
War, and some of its historical and philosophical context. In Section 4, I thoroughly review 
Douglasian Cultural Theory. Section 5 contains the results of my sociological reading of 
the Art of War, which is meant to be more suggestive than definitive. Then, in Section 6, I 
discuss  how  Cultural  Theory  could  be  utilized  for  the  ‘art  of  war’.  Finally,  Section  7  
succinctly concludes the paper.   
2 Abductive reasoning in research practice 
2.1 Mills’ “Intellectual craftsmanship” 
 Through methodology one asks how to “go about studying a phenomenon” 
(Silverman 2001:4). In general, methodology is one’s strategy of setting up and carrying 
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out a research project to acquire and/or construct knowledge2 through certain methods of 
data collection and data analysis all of which are held together by some internal logic (e.g. 
Wellington et al. 2005:107). While there are a multitude of philosophically and/or 
pragmatically grounded methodology books which provide more specific guidelines to 
choose from, I kept it ‘simple’ and turned to the most popular (and for good reason, in my 
opinion) of sociological writings, C. Wright Mills’ (1959) classic The Sociological 
Imagination, specifically the appendix entitled “On Intellectual Craftsmanship” (195-226). 
Sociologist and methodologist Clive Seale (2004:11) introduces C. Wright Mills’ 
“intellectual craftsmanship” as a more informal practice that is barely covered in 
conventional methodology books but which is actually vital to research. I find that the 
underlying logic, on which it is based, is more ‘formal’ than might be supposed.  
 For Mills, an “intellectual craftsman” is one (a social scientist) whose work 
(scholarship as the practice of a craft) is inseparable from his/her life. This being the case, 
one’s experience is an essential component of one’s scholarship; one should trust in one’s 
own experience and, at the same time, be skeptical of it. As methodologist Martyn 
Hammersley (2004) describes it, from the perspective of social research as craft “research 
competence” comes from “the building up of skills [and, thus, the gaining of more 
experience]”. These “skills are by their nature practical rather than technical. In other 
words, they cannot be codified in such a way as to be transmitted simply by explicit 
instruction from one person to another.” (Hammersley 2004:551). Since life and work are 
not  separate,  for  Mills,  the  improvement  of  one’s  professional  skills  assists  in  the  
development of one’s personal life and vice versa. In my case, the research topic of this 
paper was always meant as a platform to lead to the discovery of new tools for use inside 
and outside of academia. This is not just for self-development, though, for an intellectual 
craftsman works on people’s “private troubles” and society’s “public issues” and how they 
are related to each other. In order to have the time and energy to work on these “problems 
of substance” he or she should avoid tiring and time-consuming methodological debates 
(qualitative vs. quantitative, for instance). As sociologist Andrew Abbott (2004:43) puts it, 
                                               
2 This depends on one’s view of knowledge, in other words, one’s epistemology. So, for example, a realist 
epistemology (in broad terms) purports to describe characteristics of the world ‘out there’ while a 
constructivist epistemology (in broad terms) proposes that we cannot transcend our own experience. 
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“social reality often resists the charms of methodology3”. Thus, to be a “good craftsman”, 
Mills advises, one should “[s]tand for the primacy of the individual scholar. Avoid the 
fetishism of method and technique. Let every[one] be [their] own methodologist...[their] 
own theorist...Above all, seek to develop and to use the sociological imagination.” (Mills 
1959:211). For Mills this mostly meant the ability to shift perspectives in order to construct 
“an adequate view of a total society and its components” (ibid.). He lists seven perspective-
shifting heuristic devices (though he does not explicitly call them that) in order to 
“stimulate the sociological imagination”. These include: keeping a file of notes, quotes, 
thoughts, etc. that one could empty out then reorganize to foster new associations, finding 
synonyms of major terms to elaborate on their connotations, casting ideas into types that 
are then cross-classified via charts and other visual aids, making the opposite assumption, 
changing a phenomenon’s proportions, doing trans-historical and/or cross-cultural case 
comparisons, and distinguishing between ‘topics’ and ‘themes’ then arranging them. (Mills, 
1959:195-226). Sociologist Margareta Bertilsson (2004:381) contends that for Mills 
“releasing” the sociological imagination is the “challenge” of abductive reasoning or 
abduction.  
2.2 Abductive reasoning as essential to research of any kind  
 The term ‘abduction’ was translated into Latin as abductio from the Greek apagögé 
by Julius Pacius, an Aristotelian scholar, in 1597. The etymology ab (‘away from’) and 
??cer? (‘to lead’) suggests being “led away from old to new theoretical insights” 
(Timmermans and Tavory 2012:170). For almost 300 years, it went neglected until the 
American philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) used the term ‘abduction’4 to 
                                               
3 Methodology “books forget...the imaginative voice of whimsy, surprise, and novelty. This discovery side of 
social science is more systematic than we think. Social scientists use gambits of imagination, mental moves 
they employ to hasten discovery....formulas for the opening, developing, and realizing of possibilities. Some 
are general gambits implicit in the nature of argument and description, while others arise in conceptual issues 
that pervade the disciplines. All of these gambits work within any kind of method. They make up the heuristic 
of social science, the means by which social science discovers new ideas.” (Abbott 2004:42). 
4 Peirce used ‘abduction’, ‘retroduction’, ‘presumption’, and ‘hypothesis’ interchangeably. It was only later 
on that he used ‘abduction’ specifically for the generation of hypotheses and ‘retroduction’ for the selection of 
hypotheses (Burch [2001]2010). This can be a point of confusion; for example, social scientists of the critical 
realist persuasion (e.g. Danermark et al. 2002:80) treat abduction as a distinct part of retroduction. While the 
case can be made, I view the generating, ranking, and selecting of hypotheses as inclusive but not exhaustive 
of abductive reasoning, as I describe in more detail  below. Therefore, I see no need to distinguish between 
abduction and retroduction as such. For the sake of consistency, I only make use of the term ‘abduction’ or 
‘abductive reasoning’ throughout the paper. 
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designate a third form of logic separate from deduction and induction. In Peirce’s words, 
“Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that something is actually 
operative; Abduction merely suggests that something may be” (5.1715). To elaborate 
somewhat, deductive inference begins with a rule and looks for results to a case which 
either validates or falsifies the rule.  It  is  based on Aristotle’s axiom of identity (a thing is  
always  equal  to  itself,  so,  ‘A’  is  ‘A’).  A  well-known,  albeit  slightly  modified6, Peircean 
(2.623) example of deduction is as follows:  
 
Rule: All the beans from this bag are kidney beans. 
Case: These beans are from this bag. 
Result: These beans are kidney beans. 
 
 Inductive inference begins with results and looks for the rules of a case. It is based on 
Aristotle’s axiom of noncontradiction (a thing cannot be both itself and something else, so, 
‘A’ is not ‘non-A’). A Peircean (2.623) example of induction is as follows: 
 
Case: These beans are from this bag. 
Result: These beans are kidney beans. 
Rule: All the beans from this bag are kidney beans. 
 
Abduction7, on the other hand, is when what we initially believe to be the case, that 
is,  what  we  think  we  know  (a  rule)  is  jarred  as  the  result  of  something  novel  or   
anomalous—a surprising fact. A Peircean (2.623) example of abduction (called 
‘hypothesis’, then) is as follows: 
 
Rule: All the beans from this bag are kidney beans. 
Result: These beans are kidney beans. 
                                               
5 All references to Peirce’s work come from the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (eight volumes) 
and are typically abbreviated CP followed by the volume and page number(s). 
6 The original examples concern ‘white beans’. 
7 The third axiom in traditional logic, presented in Aristotle’s Organon, is the axiom of the excluded middle 
(a thing must be one of two mutually exclusive things, so, ‘A’ is not both ‘A’ and ‘non-A’). This axiom does 
not undergird abduction. Though, an abductive inference might find that a thing is both ‘A’ and ‘non-A’.  
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Case: These beans are from this bag. 
 
For Peirce, abduction strikes ‘like a flash’ of lightning (5.117). While this implies that it is 
as uncontrollable as the weather, there are certain ‘weather conditions’ that favor the 
abductive bolt such as genuine doubt (but also uncertainty, fear, and great pressure to act8) 
which urge one on to further investigation. (C.P. 5.374–375; Reichertz 2004:161). 
According to Peirce “the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases 
when belief is attained; so that the production of belief is the sole function of thought” 
(5.394). Thus, once the initial stimulus is elicited abduction becomes the only form of 
inference by which one could discover or invent a feasible, functioning hypothesis to 
explain the surprising fact (and, I would add, to relieve the dissonance of disbelief). An oft-
quoted and up to date definition of abduction along these lines is provided by cognitive 
scientist Paul Thagard who describes it as “inference to a hypothesis that provides a 
possible explanation of some puzzling phenomenon” (1988:51-52). Peirce’s (5.189) own 
depiction is as follows: 
 
“The surprising fact, C, is observed9; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true”.  
 
Cunningham, Baratta, and Esping (2005:55) bring Peirce’s view on abductive reasoning in 
relation to doubt and belief to the fore in the following way: 
 
“[Background of unremarkable experiences] — State of Belief 
The surprising fact C is observed — State of Doubt 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course — Abductive Inference 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true — Resolving Doubt 
[Background of unremarkable experiences] — State of Belief”. 
 
                                               
8 Another much less distressful condition in which abduction thrives is “musement” or “Pure Play [which] 
has no rules” (C.P. 6.458). 
9 Though it does not have to be observed (C.P. 5.597; 7.203). 
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 This process of accounting for the anomalous or novel may even foster new 
knowledge, though it is by no means definitive. For Peirce all knowledge, scientific or 
otherwise, is riddled with uncertainty (Bertilsson 2004:378). Instead, this type of inference 
is conjectural, but while abduction is less rigorous or “weaker” than deduction or induction 
it is no less important. According to Peirce, all three kinds of inference are indispensable 
for scientific inquiries.  
 In the first step of his “scientific method”, as he calls it, is the discovery of a 
hypothesis via abductive reasoning (C.P. 7.202). The second step is the making of 
predictions from the hypothesis through deduction. The third step is the search for facts that 
will confirm the hypothesis through induction. If the necessary facts cannot be found the 
process iterates until they can be, the goal being, as mentioned above, to convert doubt into 
belief (C.P. 5.384). For Peirce the use of his scientific method would help to discipline 
people’s everyday perceptions and elevate them to a more “critical common sense” 
(Bertilsson 2004:387). Better informed by the believable (though by definition uncertain) 
conjectures concerning the many surprises that everyday life poses, people could then act 
accordingly (e.g. C.P. 5.27-28). Despite abduction’s utility, it still took some time for it to 
become fashionable in academia.  
 Presently, Peircean abduction is quite prevalent throughout the academy. Most of 
this attention, however, is either toward abduction as a means of generating plausible 
hypotheses to explain some surprising event (C.P. 5.171) and/or as a means of evaluating or 
‘choosing’, in Peirce’s words, amongst those plausible hypotheses generated, which one is 
the “best explanation”, in contemporary terminology, for said event (C.P. 7.219)10. For 
many  social  researchers  who  do  not  adhere  to  positivism  or  its  variants  (e.g.  logical  
positivism, etc.) as the philosophical paradigm underpinning a social scientific method11, 
abduction becomes the centerpiece of alternatives to the scientific method in general (e.g. 
Haig 2005; Ragin and Amoroso 2010) or the underlying logic of particular social scientific 
methods (e.g. Dey 2004 on grounded theory; Krippendorff [1980]2012 on content analysis; 
Wodak and Meyer 2001 on critical discourse analysis). For the former ‘group’ abduction, 
                                               
10 Thus, abduction can be used within the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification” (e.g. 
Timmermans and Tavory 2012:170). Abduction discovers, and it also argues. It “has persuasive force and is 
thus  a  rhetorical  pattern  on  a  par  with  but  distinct  from  the  enthymeme  [deduction]  and  the  paradigm  
[induction]” (Bybee 1991:296). 
11 A positivist scientific method is underwritten by deduction (e.g. Ragin and Amoroso 2010). 
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deduction, and induction work together in a cyclical fashion similar to Peirce’s description 
of the scientific method. While for the latter, abduction is the outcome of alternating 
between the different empirical domains of theory (where deduction would be the starting 
point) and data (where induction would be the starting point). These ways of understanding 
abduction are not necessarily at odds.  
 Peirce himself makes numerous interpretations of abduction such as guessing, 
insight, or perception (just to name three examples) and argues for a metaphysical, theistic, 
and naturalistic basis for it, which can seem inconsistent and be quite confounding. 
Whatever one makes of how Peirce attempts to ground abduction, Peirce’s arguments are 
not ‘sociological’ enough. For example, as we shall see in the section on Cultural Theory in 
order for something to be ‘surprising’ to someone it must be so within the purview of their 
culture; what can be surprising and to whom is taken for granted by Peirce and most other 
researchers of abductive reasoning. Instead, sociologists Timmermans and Tavory 
(2012:172) argue that “socially cultivated and cultivatable ways of seeing [should] become 
the preconditions for abductive reasoning...cultured knowledge provides a way to conceive 
of abduction as socially located, positional knowledge that can be deepened and marshaled 
for theory construction.” I fully agree. In any case, the usages of abduction show that it is 
not just alternative frameworks of the scientific method and/ or certain methods that utilize 
abductive reasoning as their underlying logic. “Peirce’s logic [beginning with abduction] is 
the whole logical apparatus of the physical and social sciences,” (Burch [2001]2010). 
(Burch [2001]2010; Magnani 2001; Peirce 1934-1963; Shank 1998; Timmermans and 
Tavory 2012). 
2.2.1 Heuristic devices and abductive types  
 Heuristics [originally from the Greek heuriskein,  ‘to  discover’]  can  be  used  to  
discover or invent hypotheses as well as be used to select the “best” one (e.g. Schurz 2008). 
Besides the heuristic devices listed by Mills (1959:212-217), other social scientists (e.g. 
Abbott 2004; Jaccard and Jacoby 2009) find that heuristics can be utilized for 
contemplating phenomena and producing insights as well (though they, unfortunately, do 
not link heuristics to the sociological imagination or abduction). Some of the heuristics 
Abbott (2004) describes include: using topics and commonplaces from rhetoric and 
philosophy like Aristotle’s four causes, making an analogy, borrowing a method from 
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another discipline, inverting an assumption, analyzing counterfactuals (‘what if’ 
statements), and surveying theoretical debates12. Jaccard and Jacoby (2009) also list 26+ 
heuristics in their guide to theory construction and model-building. Some of their heuristics 
overlap  with  Mills.  In  fact,  they  explicitly  list  his  advice  to  change  the  proportion  of  
something one is studying; they also list his advice to try making the opposite assumption 
and to look at the extremes of a phenomenon, though they do not credit him for the latter 
two.  Some  of  their  heuristics  also  overlap  with  Abbott  such  as  promoting  the  use  of  
analogies and counterfactual thought experiments, for example. Other useful heuristics they 
mention include: analyzing paradoxical situations, visualization, investigating deviant 
cases13, using both explanations rather than only one of them, and even focusing on one’s 
emotions14. (Jaccard and Jacoby 2009:48-67). Most of the aforementioned forms of 
“heuristic-based” musement can be organized as two broad types of abduction, “theoretical 
abduction” and “manipulative abduction”.   
 According to philosopher and cognitive scientist Lorenzo Magnani (2001, 2005), 
theoretical abduction” itself consists of two kinds, “sentential abduction”, associated with 
logic and other verbal or symbolic systems, and “model-based abduction”, associated with 
(mental) visual imagery such as maps, pictures, and so on. Finding synonyms and creating 
analogies can fall under the rubric of sentential abduction, while cross-classifying types and 
engaging in visualization can fall under the rubric of model-based abduction. The second 
broad type of abduction Magnani discusses is “manipulative” or “action-based abduction”. 
It  is  through the use of external objects such as talking (out loud) to oneself,  using one’s 
fingers to count, writing on a piece of paper, or using a computer, etc. that one can think 
through doing. Mills (1959:212) also recognized the usefulness of external objects when he 
advises that one should keep a file and occasionally reorder the folders’ contents to 
construct new bridges between concepts. As this example of Mills’ demonstrates, 
                                               
12 Timmermans and Tavory (2012:173) concur with Abbott that “existing theories read either as an argument 
or as a way of argumentation, a way of seeing that may foster further theoretical innovation”.  Furthermore, 
for them, the methodological steps of grounded theory such as “field note taking, theoretical sampling, coding 
along various dimensions, memo writing, constant comparing, and sorting and diagramming memos...when 
performed against a theoretical background” can also be used to elicit abductive reasoning (ibid. 175). 
13 Gathering negative cases or alternative accounts via different theories to explain a phenomenon can also 
induce abduction (Timmermans and  Tavory  2012:176). 
14 According to Thagard, “abduction originates with an emotional reaction [i.e. ‘puzzlement’ and] ends with 
one, because formation and acceptance of explanatory hypotheses usually produce positive emotions” 
(2007:228). Magnani (2001) also describes abductive reasoning from emotions.  
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theoretical and manipulative abduction can also be used together as well as in conjunction 
with a possible third type of abduction. By “revisiting the phenomena”, it is also “a way to 
harness temporality in the service of theory construction” (Timmermans and Tavory 
2012:176). Magnani (2001:115-124) calls the function of time in abductive reasoning 
“temporal abduction”. Any of the aforementioned scholarly advice can act as means for 
promoting abduction which can then be converted into full-scale scientific research from 
“impression” to “attentive observation” to “musing” to “a lively give and take of 
communion between self and self” to a “specializ[ing]” of “one’s observations and 
reflections” as Peirce describes it (6.459).   
As I have hopefully demonstrated, Mills’ (1959) “On Intellectual Craftsmanship”, 
while written in an informal manner, provides a way of studying phenomena that can be 
more formalized. On its own, it comes complete with creative tools (i.e. heuristic devices) 
and an underlying logic (abduction), rooted in Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’15, that can act as a 
‘force multiplier’ to one’s own thinking and be readily adapted into one’s own 
methodology. If Mills’ intellectual craftsmanship can help him produce a masterwork like 
his 1956 The Power Elite then it is a powerful tool indeed and worthy of more 
methodological consideration.  
2.2.2 The abductive attitude 
 The overall aim for the researcher is to cultivate an “attitude of preparedness to 
abandon old convictions and to seek new ones...a state of preparedness for being taken 
unprepared” when the strike hits (Reichertz 2004:163, italics in original). In agreement with 
sociologist  Steve Fuller (2006),  I  believe that  logic,  experience,  or some admixture of the 
two does not exhaust how one can bring about knowledge. Still, in utilizing both logic (e.g. 
Peirce’s scientific method) and experience in an explicit and reflexive manner I can 
discipline my sociological (scientific) thinking and make it more rigorous. As one can see 
above, it is not only rigor but rigor in combination with imagination that is decisive for 
(social)  scientific  endeavors  of  any  kind  (Abbot  2004).  At  bottom,  this  is  what  Mills’  
‘sociological imagination’ as abductive reasoning is about—intellectual growth through 
shifting one’s perspective (that could then be used pragmatically for the betterment of 
                                               
15 The name he gave his philosophy to differentiate it from the other forms of pragmatism of his day (e.g. 
Burch [2001]2010). 
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society). In order for such intellectual growth to occur, one first needs to be surprised, 
shocked even, so as to instigate the generation of hypotheses for the advancement of 
thought. While novel or anomalous ideas, things, and events can occur daily to varying 
degrees, one can also instigate novelty and anomaly through a multiplicity of means, e.g., 
heuristic devices. “Often, the process of puzzling through the data not only will create a 
new puzzle but may actually construct a new game with new rules for thinking about the 
relationship between different pieces” (Timmermans and Tavory 2012:177). 
Methodological rigidity, though, does not allow the intellectual atmosphere one requires to 
“give accidents a chance” (Reichertz 2004:63)16. I am a firm believer that “unfettered 
thought is the most essential of research methods” (Andreski 1972:109). Thus, I utilize 
heuristic devices and abductive reasoning in its diversity to help kindle then re-kindle my 
thinking.  The  end  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  see  things  (and  show  things)  from  a  new  
perspective, in the case of this paper, the Art of War (the subject of the next section) 
rendered sociologically and Cultural Theory (the subject of the section after next) rendered 
artfully. 
3 Sun Zi’s Art of War  
3.1 Sun Zi and the Art of War in context 
3.1.1 The historical Sun Zi 
Little  is  really  known  about  Sun  Zi’s  life17. Most scholars conclude that he lived 
from about 544 BC to 496 BC during the long-running Zhou Dynasty (c. 1046-256 BC) in 
the era known as the “Spring and Autumn Period” (c. 771-476 or as late as 403 BC). This 
would make him a younger contemporary of both Kong Fu Zi (Confucius) and Lao Zi, 
founder of philosophical Taoism. According to traditional accounts such as Sima 
                                               
16 Though, it is conceivable that even closely following a methodology or strategy, for instance, in a context 
that it is not usually used could help produce abductive reasoning. 
17 A biography of sorts could be compiled from a variety of sources with varying degrees of reliability and 
could  go  something  like  the  following:  Sun  Wu  was  born  in  the  northern  state  of  Qi  in  what  is  now  the  
Shandong province (though, “The Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yue” claims that he came from the 
state  of  Wu).  Originally,  his  family’s  surname  was  Chen  and  then  Tian.  When  Sun  Wu’s  grandfather  was  
awarded a piece of property by the king of Qi for military services rendered, he was officially renamed “Sun” 
which means ‘grandson’. By Sun Wu’s time, though, his family was shih, or nobility that had lost their estate, 
due to the political upheavals of the period.  Most of the shih became roving academics, of some sort, for their 
subsistence, but Sun Wu, born into an aristocratic family that was both literate and expert in war, became a 
mercenary. For unknown reasons he fled from his home state of Qi and went to the southeastern state of Wu 
where he would eventually become known as the sage-general “Master Sun”. (e.g. Griffith 1963; Mair 2007). 
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Qian’s Shi ji (“The Records of the Grand Historian”), by 500 BC Sun Wu had written the 
thirteen chapters18 of the Art of War. In 512 BC he presented it to King Helu (or Helü) of 
the state of Wu. This is the setting of the infamous account19 about how the man who 
would be called Sun Zi demonstrated his skill in generalship to the King of Wu in order to 
procure employment. How Sun Wu lived and how he died is not known beyond this. 
According to Victor Mair, Sinologist and translator of the Sun Zi, the reason that it is not 
known how he lived or died is because ‘Sun Wu’ never existed in the first place20. 
 Briefly,  Mair’s  argument  goes  as  follows:  neither  “The  Records”  nor  “The  Spring  
and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yue”, which corroborate its account of Sun Zi, are 
considered historically accurate. For one, the Art of War could not have been written during 
the  Spring  and  Autumn period.  Close  analysis  of  anachronisms  in  the  text  such  as  terms,  
technology, techniques, and so on21 demonstrates that it was composed, 100 to 150 years 
after22 Sima Qian’s account, which would place its authorship during the Warring States 
period (as early as 475 or as late as 403 to 221 BC)23. The Warring States period is a time 
                                               
18 Since paper was not invented yet, it was probably “written with ink made of soot on sections of bamboo or 
on thin wooden slips” as was usually the case (Griffith 1963:14).  
19 Upon presenting his thirteen chapters to the king of Wu, Sun Wu was asked if his principles of, say, troop 
movements could be applied to anyone. Sun Wu replied, “Yes”. He then decided to test him by having Sun 
Wu turn the king’s harem of 180 concubines into soldiers. Sun Wu began by dividing them up into two 
companies. He next appointed Helu’s two favorite concubines as the captains of each company. Then Sun Wu 
gave the order to face right, but the concubines giggled. Sun Wu responded by saying that as the general he 
was responsible for making certain that the soldiers comprehended his commands. So, he repeated the 
command, and, once again, the concubines giggled. He repeated the instructions three times and explained 
them five more times. Again he responded that the general is responsible for making certain that the soldiers 
comprehended his commands, but if they were not followed, even after being made clear, then it was a 
violation of military law on the part of the officers. Sun Wu ordered the king's two favorite concubines to be 
executed. The king protested, “Without these two concubines my food will not taste sweet.” Sun Wu 
explained that once a general was chosen by a ruler it was the general’s duty to complete his charge by any 
means necessary, despite the ruler’s objections. So they were executed, and new captains from among the 
concubines were appointed in their place. Now, fully aware of the price for disregarding their orders, both 
companies of concubines performed their drills perfectly. With Sun Wu by his side King Helu subdued the 
states of Chu, Qi, and Qin and became the hegemon of the period. (Based on the Shi ji’s account as translated 
by Griffith 1963:58-59). This account basically comprises Sun Wu’s ‘biography’. 
20 He is not alone in believing that Sun Wu as Sun Zi did not exist at all but is instead a legendary figure (e.g. 
Griffith 1963:1-12). 
21 “Tradition holds that the Sun Zi was a product of the late Spring and Autumn period, but — judging both 
from internal and external evidence — this is completely impossible. Everything that the Sun Zi has to say 
about the pattern of war, battle tactics, the conduct of armies, strategic planning, and weaponry is irrelevant to 
the Spring and Autumn period but perfectly compatible with the Warring States period.”  (Mair 2007:27-28). 
22 According to Mair’s estimates, it was composed over a span of time beginning in 345 and ending in 272 
BC (2007:29), for he argues that Sun Zi’s work, like other works of its time, is a composite text. 
23 Others (e.g. Sawyer 2007), however, argue that Sun Zi was who the “Records” and “Annals” say he was—
general, strategist, and author of the Art of War. They argue that anachronisms found in the Art of War do not 
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of  continuous  warfare  among the  seven  states  of  Zhao,  Chu,  Qi  Qin,  Han,  Wei,  and  Yan 
who fought to dominate eastern China. More importantly, ‘Sun Wu’ (as Sun Zi) is a mythic 
figure composed of two separate historical personages, Wu Zixu24, a hero of the Spring and 
Autumn Period, and Sun Bin (c. 380-316 BC during the Warring States period), author of 
his own, closely related bing fa called the Military Methods25 and, it is claimed by Sima 
Qian in the Shi ji26, ‘descendant’ of Sun Zi. In sum, Mair ascribes the majority of the Art of 
War to  Sun  Bin27 to whom the title of “Master Sun” should only be credited (see Mair 
                                                                                                                                               
necessarily point to a later date of authorship. Instead, it is quite reasonable to assume that the teaching of Sun 
Zi’s  military  strategy  was  passed  down  through  the  generations  to  Sun  Bin  and  other  descendants  or  to  a  
school of adherents who revised and supplemented the work during that time (ibid. 151-152, 421-422). 
24 It is he who fled to Wu from his hometown of Chu because his father and brother were slain by the king. It 
is also he, rather than Sun Wu, that helped King Helu of Wu become hegemon of the region (Mair 2007:10, 
12-13). 
25 “Once the thirteen chapters of the Sun Zi assumed canonical form (before the middle of the third century 
BC), the residue of Sun Zi materials were shunted off into the [16 chapters of the] Sun Bin” (Mair 2007:22). 
In conjunction with the historical evidence that Sun Wu most likely did not exist while Sun Bin most likely 
did, Mair also points out that the texts’ individual styles further corroborate this. Sun Wu’s Art of War is “a 
pastiche of apothegms loosely patched together” while Sun Bin’s Military Methods “consists of dialogs with 
historical personages, often embedded in a believable narrative context” like other military treatises of the 
time (ibid. 63, n. 28). 
26 While there is other historical evidence corroborating Sun Bin’s existence, Mair (2007:10-12, 17) sees his 
biography in the Shi ji as more ‘believable’ than the one preceding it on Sun Wu.  
27 ‘Bin’ means ‘kneecapped’. How he got his name as told in his biography, found in the Shi ji,  is  worth  
citing in its entirety. 
 
  “More than a hundred years after Sun Wu died there was Sun Bin. Bin was born between E and Juan 
[in what is today Shandong Province]. He was a descendant of Sun Wu. Sun Bin once studied the methods of 
war (bingfa) together with Pang Juan. After Pang Juan took up service in Wei, he obtained a command under 
King Hui (r. 369–335 BC), but thought his own ability inferior to Sun Bin’s and secretly had a man summon 
Sun Bin. When Bin arrived, Pang Juan grew fearful that Sun was more worthy than himself. Jealous of him, 
he  had  both  his  feet  cut  off  and  his  face  tattooed as  punishment  by  law,  hoping that  Sun would  retire  and 
refuse to appear.  
 An envoy from Qi went to Liang. Sun Bin, since he was a convict who had suffered the punishment 
of mutilation, met with the Qi envoy in secret and advised him. The Qi envoy thought him remarkable and 
secretly carried Bin to Qi with him in his carriage. Qi’s general Tian Ji thought much of Sun Bin and made 
him his guest. Ji raced horses and gambled heavily with the Noble Scions of Qi several times. Sun Zi noticed 
that the horses’ speed was not much different and that the horses fell into high, middle, and low grades. After 
this, Sun Zi told Tian Ji, “Just bet heavily, My Lord, and I can make you the winner.” 
  Tian Ji confidently agreed and bet a thousand pieces of gold with King Wei (r. 378–343 BC) and the 
Noble Scions of Qi on a race. Just before the wager Sun Zi said, “Now match their high-grade horses with 
your low-grade horses, take your high-grade horses to match their middlegrade horses, and take your middle-
grade horses to match their low-grade horses.”  
 After they raced the three grades of horses, Tian Ji lost once but won twice and eventually gained the 
king’s thousand pieces of gold. After this, Ji presented Sun Zi to King Wei. King Wei questioned him on the 
arts of war and made him his counselor.  
 Some time later, Wei attacked Zhao. Zhao was hard pressed and sought help from Qi. King Wei of 
Qi wanted to make Sun Bin commander, but Sun declined: “A mutilated criminal will never do.” King Wei 
then made Tian Ji commander and Sun Zi his counselor.  
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2007: 9-23 for the full argument). Based on the evidence presented by Mair and other 
scholars I lean toward this interpretation. (Griffith, 1963; Mair, 2007; Sawyer, 2007). The 
next contextual item that can help to understand the Art  of  War better concerns its 
connection with philosophical Taoism28. 
3.1.2 The Art of War and Taoism 
 Due to space constraints I only touch on some of the key philosophical concepts of 
Taoism as they relate to the Art of War. I do this is by comparing and contrasting the Art of 
War with  the  foundational  text  of  Taoism,  Lao  Zi’s  Dao De Jing (Tao Te Ching) in the 
form of the chart (Table 3.1) below. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 Sun occupied a wagon where he sat and drew up plans and strategies (ji mou). Tian Ji wanted to lead 
the troops to Zhao. Sun Zi said, “To untangle a snarled mess, one does not raise his fists, and to stop a fight 
one does not grab or bind. Seize him at his throat and charge him where he is defenseless; his formations 
attacked, his power constrained, he will retire of his own accord. Liang and Zhao are attacking each other 
now; their swift soldiers and picked troops are sure to be exhausted outside on the battlefield, their aged and 
infirm exhausted inside the cities. It  would be better for My Lord to lead the troops in a rush to Da Liang; 
block its roads and highways, and strike it when still undefended. Liang is sure to release Zhao and save itself. 
I would thus in one swoop raise the siege of Zhao and exhaust Wei [i.e., Liang].”  
 Tian  Ji  followed  his  advice  and  Wei  did  indeed  leave  Handan,  and  fought  with  Qi  at  Guiling.  Qi  
crushed the Liang army.  
 Thirteen years later, Wei and Zhao attacked Han. Han informed Qi of its straits. Qi had Tian Ji take 
command and go to Han’s rescue. He rushed straight to Da Liang. Wei’s commander Pang Juan [Sun Bin’s 
old enemy] heard this, left Han, and returned to Wei, but Qi’s army had already passed him and advanced 
west into Wei. Sun Zi told Tian Ji, “These troops of Three Jin have always been both fierce and courageous, 
and have little regard for Qi, since Qi has a name for cowardice. A skilled fighter acts according to the 
situation and directs the course of events by offering the enemy advantages. According to the arts of war, 
‘when one races after advantage for a hundred tricents [an ancient Chinese unit of distance], the commander 
falls; when one races after advantage for fifty tricents, only half the army arrives.’ When Qi’s army enters 
Wei territory, have them make cooking fires for a hundred thousand; the next day make fires for fifty 
thousand; and the day after make fires for thirty thousand.”  
 On the third day of Pang Juan’s march, Pang rejoiced. “I knew Qi’s troops were cowards; three days 
after entering my territory, over half their officers and men have fled.” He abandoned his infantry and covered 
two days’ distance in one day with lightly armed, picked soldiers, pursuing Qi’s troops. Sun Zi judged that 
they would reach Maling at dusk. The road through Maling was narrow and there were numerous barriers on 
both sides where troops could be hidden. Sun stripped the bark off a great tree and carved on it, “Pang Juan 
died at the foot of this tree.” After this he ordered the best archers in Qi’s army to hide along both sides of the 
road with ten-thousand crossbows and arranged a signal. “When you see a brand at dusk, fire in concert.” 
 As he expected, Pang Juan reached the foot of the stripped tree at night, saw the inscription, and 
struck a fire to illuminate it. Before he had finished reading Sun’s inscription, the Qi army’s ten-thousand 
crossbows all fired at once and Wei’s army was thrown into chaos and confusion. Pang Juan, realizing that he 
had been outwitted and his troops defeated, cut his throat: “Now this whelp’s name is made!” 
 The Qi army, following up on their victory, crushed Pang’s army, captured Wei’s Heir, Shen, and 
returned. Sun Bin’s name was renowned throughout the world because of this; his bingfa (“methods of war”) 
is transmitted to the present generation.” (from Sima Qian’s Shi ji in Mair 2007:14-17). 
28 The Sun Zi is twice included in the canon of Taoist texts (Mair 2007:47). 
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Table 3.1: Comparisons and contrasts between Sun Zi’s Art of War and  
Lao Zi’s the Dao De Jing 
 
(After Combs 2000; Ma 2001; Mair 2007; Raphals 1992; Treat and Croghan 2001) 
 
 
Comparisons 
 
 
Title: 
 
 
Sun Zi 
 
Dao De Jing 
 
 
Dating:  
Traditional 
 
Actual 
 
 
Late Spring and Autumn period  
 
About two centuries later during second half of 4th century BC. 
  
 
Authorship:  
Traditional 
 
Actual 
 
 
“hazy, legendary figure” 
(Sun Wu) 
 
 
"vague, semi-divine founder” 
(Lao Zi) 
 
the work of several authors and editors over a significant 
amount of time                                                    
 
 
 
Style: 
 
short, pithy sayings vague enough to be applied widely to different contexts yet detailed enough 
to provide practical advice 
 
 
Themes:  
 
1. Holistic and dynamic character of human experience 
2. Self-development 
3. Opposites as mutually causal  
4. Constant change  
5. Tao/dao29  
6. Wu-wei30 
                                               
29 According to the Taoist ‘Way’, “all things are relative, all opposites blend, all contrasts are harmonized. 
The One is tao. It is the total spontaneity of all things. All is so-of-itself. Tao therefore can ‘do everything by 
doing nothing’” (Parrinder 1983:333 in Combs 2002:281). 
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A Taoist view of war in the 
Sun Zi: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Seen  as  last  resort  but  sometimes  necessary  to  protect  
country’s interests, even survival  
 
2. Minimalist approach (“principle of parsimony”): least 
amount of effort, expenditure, risk, use of force and loss 
of life  
 
3. No peace without war 
 
4. “[S]elf-reflexive insight is infinitely more predictive of 
success  than  some  self-deluded  quest  for  certain  
victory” (Treat and Croghan 2001:434). 
 
 
Contrasts 
 
 
“The chief difference”  
 
 
 
 
 
Also,  
 
 
a manual for the “wuwei-
minded general” 
 
Tao/Dao is a more pragmatic 
idea 
 
te (or de, i.e., virtus31) term in 
the Tao Te Ching / Dao De 
Jing is absent in the Sun Zi 
 
a manual for the “wuwei-
minded ruler” 
 
Tao/Dao is a metaphysical 
idea 
 
 
 
 
Comments about and criticisms of the relationship between the Art of War and Taoism: 
 
1. Talk of manipulation, gaining advantage in every situation, accumulating personal power, 
and attaining self-efficacy as goals distort of the true nature of Taoism (Ma 2001:436) 
 
2. Taoists emphasize that the tao cannot be verbalized, but the authors of the Art of War 
consciously attempt to articulate and to teach military principles (e.g. Raphals 1992:103) 
 
3. The rhetorical style of parsimony that Combs (2000) finds throughout Sun Zi’s work 
does not make it Taoist; it can be the result of being philosophically-oriented and 
utilizing a smaller vocabulary (Ma 2001:438) 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
30 Wu-wei is a simplicity facilitated by “knowing the principles, structures, and trends of human and natural 
affairs so well that one uses the lease amount of energy in dealing with them” (Watts 1975:76). 
31 Virtus refers  to  ‘virtue’,  but  in  the  original  Latin  it  denotes  a  kind  of  virtue  derived  from  ‘manliness’,  
‘excellence of character’, or ‘valor’ (Mair 2007:47-48). 
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As one can see from the chart above, while there are comparable perspectives between the 
Sun Zi and the Dao De Jing, scholars do not agree to what degree Taoism influenced the 
authors of the Art of War. Despite this lack of consensus, Taoism is a significant feature of 
the text’s original setting.  
3.2 Some stylistic and compositional features of the Art of War 
 The  original  text  of  the  Art of War is  written  in  ancient  Chinese  with  a  style  of  
language that is pithy and almost poetic. It utilizes rhetorical devices such as repetition, 
parallelism, and lists giving it a compact logic that would not tax the memory. Taken 
together, these features suggest that the Art of War was  initially  orally  transmitted  as  
sayings and later joined together and added to in a “loosely cobbled structure” (Mair 
2007:30-32, 34). The dating and the arrangement of the various chapters also support these 
findings. 
 If one arranges the chapters according to the chronological order of the dates Mair 
(2007) provides, one finds that chapters 9 (345 B.C.), 10 (342 B.C.), 8 (336 B.C.?), and 11 
(330 B.C.) form the infantry-centered ‘core’ of the Art of War, most likely written or orally 
transmitted by Sun Bin (ca. 380-ca. 325 B.C.). Chapter 7 also belongs to this group 
content-wise, but it was written in 317 B.C. Still, as a group, these chapters focus on types 
of  terrain  while  placing  extra  emphasis  on  the  tactical  positioning  of  troops  in  relation  to  
them. Chapters 6 (316 B.C.), 5 (314 B.C.), 4 (313 B.C.), 3 (312 B.C.), 2 (311), 1 (309 B.C.) 
deliberate on primary strategy. If they are broken down even further chapters 1 through 3 
relate to general military doctrine and method where chapter 1 concerns making 
computations before battle, chapter 2 combat in the battlefield, and chapter 3 conquering 
cities. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 get increasingly more abstract with 4 and 5 relating to form and 
formlessness while chapter 6 relates to emptiness and fullness, “the most abstract notions of 
all”. Chapters 12 (310 B.C.) and 13 (272 B.C. more than 25 years after chapter 1, the 
penultimate chapter chronologically) concern more expert subject matter, incendiary 
attacks and the use of spies, respectively. (Mair 2007:27-30).  
3.3 Which translation of the Art of War? 
 The Art of  War first appeared in “the West” in 1772 as a “translation” (it is more 
like a summary with running commentary) by Father J.J.M. Amiot, one of the first Jesuits 
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in China (e.g. Grifftith 1963:179). It first appeared in English in 1905 and was translated 
was by Captain E. F. Calthrop, a British officer, while studying in Japan (Mair 2007:51). 
British translator and scholar Lionel Giles’ 1910 English rendition (now public domain) of 
the Art of War was the English translation until its top spot was usurped by General Samuel 
Griffith’s (1963) translation, which I consider a classic and a treasure trove of information. 
Other favorites of mine include: Professor John Minford’s 2002 more poetically-inclined 
version and Sinologist Victor Mair’s 2007 translation, which is the main one I use for this 
project. It has been voted the best translation by Sonshi.com. On top of the fact that it 
contains a remarkable essay comparing and contrasting Sun Zi and Carl von Clausewitz by 
international relations specialist and Chinese historian Arthur Waldron, state-of-the-art 
information, and compelling arguments of the Art of War’s authorship and dating, it is, at 
bottom, eminently readable. 
3.4 The Art of War: A chapter by chapter overview  
 Here is a brief overview of the Art of War’s subject matter segueing into a synopsis 
of each chapter. Despite its brevity, the Sun Zi bing fa covers a lot of ground. For Sun Zi, 
war secures the state; this makes the strategist-general the state’s protector. The strategist-
general has knowledge of leadership, military organization, the weather, and terrain. More 
importantly, the strategist-general has self-knowledge and foreknowledge of the opposing 
generals, their armies, and so on through reconnaissance and the gathering of intelligence 
before battle. He compares his capabilities with those of his enemy; he calculates the 
probability of victory and plans accordingly. The strategist-general perceives the ‘shape’ of 
the  enemy  through  the  Clausewitzian  ‘fog  of  war’  and  distinguishes  the  real  from  the  
illusory. Furthermore, he is able to hide his own ‘shape’ while creating illusions of his own 
through the stealthy use of orthodox and unorthodox moves prior to and in the midst of 
battle. All of this is in the effort to catch the enemy by surprise. This is when the strategist-
general’s patience and vigilance pays off. Having mastered the art of timing, swift, decisive 
action, economical effort, and unstoppable momentum, he strikes the weakness of an 
unwary enemy with army’s full force bringing about a total victory. 
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3.4.1 Chapter One: “(Initial) Assessments”  
The Art of War32 begins, “Warfare is a great affair of the state. The field of life and 
death, the way of preservation and extinction. It cannot be left unexamined.” (Sun Zi 
translation Mair 2007:76). According to Griffith (1963:39), this is the first historical 
acknowledgment that war is not a “transitory aberration but a recurrent conscious act and 
therefore susceptible to rational analysis.” Sun Zi, thus, emphasizes the intellectual import 
of making sound calculations about the advantages and disadvantages of either waging or 
evading war. These calculations are based on the following five fundamentals: “the Way”, 
“Heaven”, “Earth”, “Generalship”, and “Method”. The Way is the moral legitimacy that 
unites a leader and the populace. Heaven concerns atmospheric and seasonal conditions in 
regards to military action, while earth concerns terrain in these regards. Generalship refers 
to the moral and intellectual faculties of the strategist-general which include: knowledge, 
trustworthiness, humaneness, bravery, and sternness in carrying out discipline of one’s 
officers and troops33.  Method  refers  to  military  organization,  the  chain  of  command,  and  
logistical  issues.  By  making  comparisons  of  both  sides  one  can  devise  a  plan.  From  this  
follows Sun Zi’s illustrious maxim, “Warfare is a way of deception” (trans. Mair 2007:78). 
From his definition of warfare,  Sun Zi then catalogs the following twelve stratagems that 
can be used to deceive one’s enemy: if capable, appear incapable; if active, appear inactive; 
if near, appear far and if far, appear near; if one’s opponents are greedy tempt them; if 
one’s opponents are in chaos, seize them; if one’s opponents are secure, prepare for them; if 
one’s opponents are strong, evade them; if one’s opponents are angry, aggravate them;  if 
one’s opponents are humble, make them arrogant; if one’s opponents are at ease, make 
them weary; if one’s opponents are united, divide them (Mair 2007:78-79). Some of these 
ploys are designed for military purposes, others for political and diplomatic purposes, and 
still others for both, but the overall result is to catch the enemy ill-equipped and oblivious34. 
Sun Zi ends the chapter by reemphasizing the making of calculations prior to battle in order 
to anticipate victory or defeat.  
                                               
32 For the most part Mair’s (2007) translation is utilized, for example, in the chapter titles and chapter-
specific terminology, but Griffith (1963) and Minford (2002) are also utilized where noted.  
33 As Raphals (1992:105) points out, these virtues are the same as those of the Confucian “gentleman”. 
34 “Attack them when they are unprepared; Come forth when they are not expecting you to do so” (Sun Zi 
trans. Mair 2007). 
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3.4.2 Chapter Two: “Doing Battle”  
 The second chapter deals more overtly with political and economic ramifications of 
doing battle. It emphasizes that victory should be obtained in the shortest amount of time, 
with the least amount of effort, and with the least amount of causalities on both sides, for 
“[n]o nation has ever benefited from a protracted war” (Sun Zi trans. Minford 2002:8). A 
prolonged war depletes energy, morale, strength, and resources leaving one weakened from 
within where officers can mutiny and rival elites can rise up and from without where foes 
can rally. Ongoing war not only affects one’s army but one’s nation as well; the negative 
impact on the economy can impoverish the populace. Instead, an army should live off of 
the enemy; even prisoners of war should be treated kindly so that they may join the ranks 
and replenish one’s forces. 
3.4.3 Chapter Three: “Planning for the Attack”   
 Sun  Zi  says,  “Causing  the  enemy  forces  to  submit  without  a  battle  is  the  most  
excellent approach” (trans. Mair 2007:85). For the majority of scholars both western and 
Chinese, “winning without fighting” signifies the central theme of Sun Zi’s strategic 
thought and even Chinese strategic thought in general (Johnston 1995:99). Thus, for Sun 
Zi, taking a nation, an army, a regiment, a detachment, or a company intact is preferred 
over their destruction. In order for victory to occur in this manner, firstly, attack the 
enemy’s strategy, secondly, their alliances, thirdly, their armies, and, as a last resort, attack 
their cities. These verses seem to show Sun Zi’s preference for nonviolent strategies over 
violent ones. Some (Wu 2003:17) even claim that Sun Zi “wanted to fight against fight 
itself with brilliant non-fight tactics”; it is a “psychological warfare” that Sun Zi promotes. 
International relations specialist Alastair Johnston argues against these assumptions, 
accepted or otherwise, and does so quite convincingly, in my opinion. Without going 
through his entire argument, I touch on the key points. For him “winning without fighting” 
is not the central theme of the Art of War, the other bing fa, or Chinese strategic thought as 
a whole. Instead, he contends that the end goal is to “respond flexibly to the enemy and 
thus create conditions for victory”. (Johnston 1995:102). This idea is best exemplified in 
the concept of quan bian or the “responding to changing circumstances according to a 
weighing  of  all  relevant  factors  in  a  strategic  situation”  which  overrides  any  a priori 
preferences for nonviolent over violent strategies (ibid. n. 53). In the case of the Art of War 
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specifically, the purposes of chapters 4 through 13, which explicitly refer to principles 
dealing with attacking the enemy (never mind Sun Zi’s opening statement), would be 
undermined if Sun Zi put any limits on what a strategist-general could do to achieve victory 
in  order  to  ensure  the  survival  of  the  state.  As  Johnston  puts  it,  “[W]ar  [is]  a  process of 
defeating the enemy” (ibid. 104). As such, Sun Zi’s continuum from attacking an enemy’s 
strategy to besieging a city is not a list of nonviolent to violent preferences but rather one of 
magnitude from least to most violent. The continuum is a series of options that a strategist-
general could, ideally, follow in sequence—first attack their strategy, next attack their 
alliances, and so on. Johnston’s interpretation is in accordance with the quan bian35 
principle as well as the relationship between deception as encapsulated in the twelve 
(mostly nonviolent) stratagems and the application of military power Sun Zi lays out in 
chapter 1. The overall notion is not necessarily nonviolence over violence, which would be 
ideal but unrealistic, but minimal violence relative to the situation (ibid. 102-105, see also 
Lord 2000:304 and Mair 2007:142, n. 4). 
 When it comes to tactics of offense, the size of one’s army and one’s rival’s army is 
crucial in deciding what course of action to take. If one’s forces are ten to one, surround 
them, if five to one, attack them, if two to one, divide them into two, if equally matched, 
fight, if fewer in number, be able to retreat, if much smaller in size, escape. Knowledge of 
these force ratios and how to utilize both large and small forces are two of the “five 
essentials” for the prediction of victory. The third relates to the solidarity of one’s forces 
from the general down to the foot soldier. The fourth requires one to be ready for the 
unforeseen. The fifth requires that the general to be free from the sovereign’s meddling. 
The chapter ends with a tool for decision-making. “Know the enemy, know myself and 
victory is never in doubt, not in a hundred battles” (Sun Zi trans. Minford 2002:17). If one 
does  not  know  the  enemy  but  knows  oneself,  then  the  win  to  loss  ratio  is  50/50.  If  one  
knows neither the enemy nor oneself, then failure is certain.  
                                               
35 Quan refers to “[p]ower, expedient (assessment]—exerted by the commander in the field” (Mair 
2007:xlv). It “is associated with change (bian) and with the use of crafty (qi), as opposed to straightforward 
(zheng) activity” (Raphals 1992:110; see also Mair 2007:xliii-xlv). 
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3.4.4 Chapter Four: “Positioning”  
In this chapter Sun Zi draws attention to offense and defense. “Invincibility,” he 
says, “depends upon oneself; vincibility,” on the other hand, rests “depends upon the 
enemy” (Sun Zi trans. Mair 2007:88). Invincibility concerns defense while vincibility 
concerns offense. Whereas defense implies deficiency, offense implies surplus. In other 
words, when an army lacks strength they should be on the defensive. When an army has an 
excess  of  strength  they  should  be  on  the  offensive.  One  can  only  prepare  one’s  own  
defenses and positioning in order to be undefeatable but must wait for the opportune time to 
strike the enemy, that is, when their defenses are low or their vulnerabilities show. The 
chapter ends with the “five steps” of planning. Measurement of space determines estimates 
which determines calculations which determines comparisons (see chapter 1 verses 11-13 
for the exact questions a strategist-general should ask) which determines the chances of 
victory. 
3.4.5 Chapter Five: “Configuration”  
When the enemy is caught unawares it is time for the strategist-general to put two 
different forces into effect. There is ordinary, orthodox, direct zheng force  and  there  is  
extraordinary, unorthodox, indirect qi force, both of which are mutually causal. Zheng can 
become qi and qi can become zheng; “their permutations are inexhaustible” (Sun Zi, trans. 
Minford 2002:26). Both forces are needed, for “[i]n warfare, [one should] engage directly 
[and] secure victory indirectly” (ibid. 25). As Griffith (1963:42-43) points out these are not 
just tactics but can be employed at the strategic level as well. Sun Zi makes use of a variety 
of metaphors such as a swooping falcon, a drawn crossbow, and boulders rolling down a 
mountainside to describe the “potential energy” released by a well-timed strike. Caught 
unawares the enemy is taken away by the abrupt onrush of overwhelming force. Such a 
situation is the general’s alone to create. 
3.4.6 Chapter Six: “Emptiness and Solidity”  
A strategist-general can coax an enemy’s defenses down by “creating [forms] to 
confuse and delude the enemy” all the while “conceal[ing] his true dispositions and 
ultimate intent” (Griffith 1963:41), in other words, via stratagems. Stratagems generate the 
parameters within which an enemy must maneuver, thereby giving them a “form” through 
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“predictive, patterned behaviors” that the strategist-general can behold and control. At the 
same time, stratagems make one “formless” or camouflage one’s true form. (e.g. Johnston 
995:97-98). While the deception of stratagems alone does not guarantee victory, it weakens 
the enemy so that one’s overall strategy remains unseen. “Subtle and insubstantial, the 
expert leaves no trace; divinely mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is a master of his 
enemy’s fate” (Sun Zi trans. Griffith 1963:97). Certain victory requires the increase in the 
density  of  the  fog  of  uncertainty.  In  the  end,  all  that  is  known  of  the  strategy  is  that  it  
worked.   
3.4.7 Chapter Seven: “The Struggle of Armies”  
 While much of how armies “struggle” is laid out in the first three chapters of the Art 
of War as Mair (2007:34) points out, some important ideas can be gleaned from chapter 
seven. For Sun Zi, maneuver during the heat of battle is the most challenging aspect of 
warfare. Because anything that can go wrong will go wrong, a strategist-general must 
become adept at “taking what is troublesome to be advantageous” (Sun Zi trans. Mair 
2007:100). To outwit one’s opponent utilize both direct and indirect approaches to “[m]ove 
when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration 
of forces” (Sun Zi trans. Griffith 1963:106). This chapter also concerns other aspects of 
maneuver such as marching to the battlefield, communicating during battle to coordinate 
the  troops,  and  logistics.  The  chapter  ends  with  nine  axioms  of  “the  art  of  war”.  These  
include: do not charge uphill, do not face an enemy with his back to a hill, do not fall for 
feigned flight, do not attack elite troops, do not swallow bait, do not prevent an army from 
returning home, do not totally surround an army but, rather, leave an escape route, and do 
not press an enemy at bay. 
3.4.8 Chapter Eight: “Nine Varieties”  
It is unclear what the “nine varieties” actually refer to in the text. Instead of “nine 
varieties” there are actually three sets of five items each. The first set of five items 
emphasizes terrain because for Sun Zi “a general unable to use ground properly was unfit to 
command” (Griffith 1963:43). So, he advises if on “unfavorable” or low-lying terrain, do 
not encamp. If at a crossroads, join up with allies. If on “forsaken” terrain, do not linger. If 
on “surrounded terrain” be resourceful and make a plan. If on “desperate terrain”, fight. 
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The strategist-general knows where to fight and how to lure the enemy to the battlefield of 
his choosing. In the second set of five items, a strategist-general knows what not to do. He 
knows which roads not to take, which armies not to attack, which cities not to besiege, 
which  terrain  not  to  contest,  and  which  of  the  ruler’s  orders  to  disobey.  The  third  set  
concerns the “five fatal flaws” of a general’s character. These include: recklessness which 
leads to destruction, cowardice which leads to capture, a short temper which is easily 
provoked, “incorruptibility” which is easy to shame, and a sympathy for his troops which 
can be harassed. These can only lead to ruination and death.  
3.4.9 Chapter Nine: “Marching the Army”  
According  to  Mair’s  dating,  this  is  the  first  chapter  written  and  is  one  of  the  four  
‘core’ chapters (the others include chapters 8, 10, and 11) around which the rest revolve. 
Superior positioning and maintaining control of one’s forces through superior leadership 
are at stake on the march. So Sun Zi provides means for how to observe the opposing army 
including several signs possible enemy trickery such as “[i]f he chooses to occupy a place 
that is easily accessible, it must be because he finds some advantage there” (Sun Zi trans. 
Mair 2007:110). He also provides numerous indications for the condition of the enemy 
such as “if they see advantage but do not advance toward it, they are weary” (ibid. 111). An 
important point Sun Zi makes in this chapter is that “[i]n war, numbers alone confer no 
advantage” (trans. Griffith 1963:122). This principle is supported sociologically. 
Sociologist  Randall  Collins  (2010)  put  together  a  model  of  his  sociological  theory  of  the  
dynamics of victory or defeat in battle that includes variables for material resources, 
morale,  and  randomness.  When  his  model  was  simulated  one  of  the  outcomes  was  that  
“morale advantages manifest themselves early in the conflict, whereas material advantages 
are more influential as the conflict drags on” (Fletcher et al. 2011:252). A swift victory 
based on “morale advantage” is exactly what Sun Zi preaches here and throughout the Art 
of War. For Sun Zi, advantage of this kind begins with “mutual trust” between the general 
and his army (Sun Zi trans. Mair 2007:112), which is to say he has the Way as seen in 
chapter 1. 
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3.4.10 Chapter Ten: “Terrain Types”  
  In this chapter36 Sun Zi once again returns to the significance of topography for 
tactical advantage. “Know heaven, know earth and your victory is complete” (Sun Zi, trans. 
Minford 2002:71). Sun Zi classifies terrain as follows: on “accessible” terrain both sides 
can come and go easily (having the high ground and secure supply lines is advantageous), 
on “hanging” terrain it is easy to advance but not to withdraw (only fight if the enemy is 
unprepared), on “branching” terrain both sides are at a disadvantage (lure, retreat, and 
attack when half of their army is out), on “narrow” terrain occupy it first, block the route, 
and wait (if they get there first do not follow them), on “ precarious” terrain occupy it first, 
if they do, do not follow them (entice them out by retreating), and on “distant” terrain when 
strength is matched engagement is not advantageous. The “way of terrain” requires diligent 
study from the strategist-general and so does the “way of defeat”. The six ways of defeat 
are as follows: “put to flight”, when one army is ten times the size of the other, “lax”, when 
the troops are strong but the officers are weak, “depressed”, when officers are strong but 
troops are weak, “collapsed”, when high ranking officers charge into battle out of 
resentment for the general before calculations are made, “chaotic”, when the general is 
weak and there is no discipline, and “routed” when a general’s misjudges comparisons of 
strength and weaknesses and sends the wrong force out to meet the enemy. Perhaps, one 
could call these “types of morally-deficient terrain”. 
3.4.11 Chapter Eleven: “Nine Types of Terrain”  
 This chapter37 seems to be a continuation of chapter eight on the “nine varieties”, as 
it follows it chronologically. Here Sun Zi classifies nine kinds of ground. “Dispersed” 
terrain is home turf; do not fight. “Easy” terrain is the penetration zone into the enemy’s 
territory frontier; do not stop. “Contested” terrain has advantages for both sides; do not 
attack. “Intersecting” terrain is easily accessible to all; do not block. When terrain is at the 
crossroads; form alliances. “Encumbered” terrain is deep into enemy territory; plunder 
them. “Unfavorable” terrain is difficult to march through such as mountains and forests; 
keep marching. “Surrounded” terrain is through narrow gorges putting one’s army in the 
                                               
36 Besides the first quote, Mair’s (2007) translation is used for the terminology. 
37 Here again, Mair’s (2007) translation is used for the terms unless otherwise noted. 
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position of being defeated by a much smaller army38; devise stratagems. “Where without a 
desperate struggle I perish, that is death ground”; fight! (Sun Zi trans. Minford 2002:74). 
This is “desperate” terrain. The chapter ends with this advice, “If the enemy opens a door, 
rush in. Seize what he holds dear, and secretly contrive an encounter” (ibid. 87). Sun Zi’s 
‘home invasion’ analogy (as rendered by Minford) seems to us to be the ideal outcome of 
being on “encumbered” terrain. 
3.4.12 Chapter Twelve: “Incendiary Attack”  
 Burn men, burn supplies, burn equipment, burn warehouses, burn lines of 
communication—these are the Sun Zi’s  targets  for  attacking  with  fire.  By  the  end  of  the  
chapter the focus shifts to fire of an ‘emotional’ nature—anger and spite, which should 
never be the impetus for battle. Anger and spite can change into pleasure and joy, but the 
destroyed and the dead stay as they are.  
3.4.13 Chapter Thirteen: “Using Spies”   
 Griffith comments that Sun Zi’s chapter on “secret operations [is] as pertinent today 
as when he composed it” (1963:44). For Sun Zi information via “[f]oreknowledge39 cannot 
be gotten from ghosts and spirits, nor can it be obtained from interpreting the symbols of 
things40, nor can it be acquired through astrological verification.” Rather, it must be gained 
from people “on the ground” who know the dispositions of the enemy, in other words, spies 
(Sun Zi trans. Mair 2007:129). There are five types of spies: local spies come from among 
the enemy’s populace, internal spies come from the enemy’s officials, double agents come 
from among the  enemy’s  spies,  those  spies  who risk  death  are  given  false  information  to  
pass on to the enemy, and those spies who escape with their lives are those that bring back 
information. The chapter also covers how spies are hired and handled. According to the Sun 
Zi, an army cannot move without being fueled by the information intelligence gathering 
supplies.  One  criticism  of  Sun  Zi’s  typology  comes  from  political  scientists  Niou  and  
                                               
38 It was on this type of ground where the Spartans lead by King Leonidas I held back a considerably larger 
Persian force at the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC. 
39 “Sun Tzu’s perhaps deepest insight is that he recognizes [that]...[secret] intelligence is always deception as 
well as knowledge, it is the struggle for the advantage of what is known, a game of covering and uncovering, 
information and disinformation...The important criterion here is not truth versus falsehood, but rather tactical 
effectiveness. It is always biased...and thus inherently bound to the side that uses it.” (Horn 2003:62-63). 
40 For the ancient Chinese commentators of the Art of War, this can include: from analogies of past events to 
divinatory practices (see Griffith 1963:8; Mair 2007:161, n. 4). 
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Ordeshook. They argue that Sun Zi does not take “triple agents” into account, which are 
double agents that are really still under the employment of the enemy and are meant to feed 
false information to the strategist-general instead (Niou and Ordeshook 1994:172). Despite 
that criticism, while using game theory to interpret the Art  of  War, Niou and Ordeshook 
(1994) find that Sun Zi should be given credit with foreseeing many of the strategies found 
among game theory’s repertoire41. 
 Now I turn on my “sociological eye”, as sociologist Randall Collins (1998:3) calls 
it, for “[w]hatever we read with the sociological eye becomes a clue to the larger patterns of 
society, here or in the past”. In order to see the Art of War from a sociological perspective I 
turn to the late anthropologist Mary Douglas’ “Cultural Theory” as my primary heuristic 
device. 
4 Cultural Theory 
4.1 Douglasian cultural theory 
4.1.1 From ‘grid-group analysis’  
In 1970 Mary Douglas published a classic ethnography about African religions 
called Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology. It is in this work that she introduced 
‘grid-group analysis’, the centerpiece of what was later to be called ‘cultural theory’ 
(henceforth CT). In Natural Symbols the theoretical framework of the ‘grid-group’ was first 
used as an approach to correlating bodily (or natural) symbolism with cosmologies, or 
belief systems about the origin and development of the universe. Later in Cultural Bias 
(1978) the typology was used for analyzing forms of social control; as Douglas now 
understood them, cosmologies were coercive devices whose effectiveness depended on the 
socio-cultural milieu. What originally began as a classificatory scheme in Natural Symbols 
essentially developed into a “sociology of belief” (i.e. what one believes is shaped by one’s 
social reality) in Cultural Bias (e.g. Mamadouh 1999; Spickard 1989). In this paper, it is 
the latter variant of Douglas’ typology and its subsequent development into a complete 
                                               
41 These include the ‘dominant’, ‘minmax’, and ‘mixed’ strategies but not the ‘equilibrium’ strategy (for 
more details see Niou and Ordeshook 1994). 
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explanatory theory by Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990) (henceforth TEW) that I will 
be utilizing. 
According to Douglas’ grid-group analysis, an individual’s options are restricted 
either by their group’s judgments and/or by their positions in a society42 that are presided 
over by certain conventions to which an individual conforms. To analyze the ‘cultures43’ 
that emerge from these forms of social control requires the following two dimensions or 
axes: ‘group’, which lies on the horizontal axis, is “the experience of a bounded social unit” 
and ‘grid’, which lies on the vertical axis, “refers to rules that relate one person to others on 
an ego-centered basis” (Douglas 1970:viii). In other words, the group dimension represents 
the general border lines around a community separating ‘us’ from ‘them’; it gauges the 
amount of control the group has over members’ lives. Whilst the grid dimension represents 
the guidelines by which community members live; it gauges the amount of control a 
group’s members are willing to accept. Both of these axes each lie on a continuum from 
‘strong’ to ‘weak’. Taken together, these two dimensions, grid and group, generate four 
conflicting but coexisting categories of social control within a particular population. While 
there are four fundamental modes of social organization, there are also a range of 
combinations, from transitional states to hybrid forms, between these extreme, ‘ideal 
types’. The table below (Table 4.1) shows the basic grid-group diagram with the labels 
Douglas  proposed  before  she  passed  away  in  2007.  These  are  the  labels  that  I  will  also  
utilize in my study. 
Table 4.1: The grid-group diagram (Adapted from Douglas 2007:2) 
 
strong grid, weak group 
 
ISOLATE 
 
strong group, strong grid  
 
POSITIONAL 
 
 
weak grid, weak group 
 
INDIVIDUALIST 
 
 
strong group, weak grid 
 
ENCLAVE 
 
 
                                               
42 For the most part, in this section I use ‘society’, ‘community’, and ‘group’ synonymously unless otherwise 
specified in the context. 
43 Also called ‘rationalities’, ‘solidarities’, ‘ways of life’, ‘ways of organizing’, ‘social orders’, ‘political 
cultures’, ‘cultural types’, or simply ‘types’ (Mamadouh 1999:396, 400) 
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 On the two left quadrants of the typology, or ‘weak group’, people value individual 
interests over group priorities; thus, they are unburdened by group pressures to achieve 
certain goals or participate in certain activities. On the two right quadrants of the typology, 
or ‘strong group’, people are stanch in their allegiance to the group and value collective 
over individual interests. In the midpoint between the left and the right quadrants, social 
pressures are in a state of equilibrium, but the individual is in a state of vacillation—unable 
to choose sides.  
 On the top two quadrants of the typology, or ‘strong grid’, people are said to behave 
according to well-defined roles, regulations, and duties established and enforced by a 
centralized authority. On the bottom two quadrants of the typology, or ‘weak grid’, these 
social parameters of people’s behavior are less restricting and more implicit; here, authority 
is decentralized. At the topmost and bottommost extremes of the grid the demarcation 
between what is pure, clean, and sacred and what is impure, unclean, and profane is the 
most distinct. While in the midpoint between the top and bottom quadrants, individuals live 
in anomie and uncertainty about what is socially acceptable behavior. This summarizes the 
two continua (in arbitrary order)—group from weak to strong and grid from strong to weak. 
Now, I turn to how the grid and group dimensions interact with each other to generate the 
four main cultures labeled ‘isolate44’, ‘individualist45’, ‘enclave46’, and ‘positional47’.  
 In the upper right quadrant, or ‘strong group, strong grid’, is the positionist’s 
culture. This mode of social control is organized as a hierarchy48 where  all  groups  are  
contained within and covered by a larger group. People’s choices are constricted by both 
the leadership within their group and by their roles in society which are assigned according 
to their gender, lineage, ethnicity, or some other criteria. They are set onto tiers in a manner 
that coincides with their traditions and by their utility to society as a whole. This high level 
                                               
44 Also known as ‘fatalism’, ‘fatalist(s)’, ‘fatalistic’, ‘insulated’, or ‘atomized subordination’  
45 Also known as ‘individualism’, ‘individualistic’, ‘competition’, or ‘entrepreneurs’  
46 Also known as ‘egalitarianism’, ‘egalitarian(s)’, ‘factionalism’, ‘sect/sectarian’, ‘dissenting groups’, 
‘communard(s)’, ‘egalitarian enclaves’, or ‘enclave(s)’ 
47 Also known as ‘hierarchist(s)’, ‘hierarchies’, ‘hierarchical’, ‘hierarchical collectivism’, or ‘positional’ (see 
Mamadouh, 1999 for a list of references to where these particular labels were used). For the sake of lexical 
symmetry, I re-label ‘enclave’ as ‘enclavist’ and ‘positional’ as ‘positionist’ but will use them interchangeably 
as the opportunity presents itself. I do not re-label ‘isolate’ as ‘isolationist’ because to be an isolationist one 
must have the power to choose the political stance of not becoming involved in other groups’ affairs. Isolates, 
as I will see, do not have that opportunity to choose. 
48  At  this  juncture,  the  form  of  government  is  irrelevant;  it  could  be  authoritarian  or  democratic  or  some  
hybrid form. 
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of classification is used to coordinate interpersonal, intergroup, and supra-group action and 
also to resolve internal conflicts via a number of strategies including “upgrading, shifting 
sideways, downgrading, resegregating, [and] redefining” (Douglas 1978:206-207, quoted in 
Thompson et al. 1990:6). Overall, members of the positional society are culturally biased 
toward the traditional, the orderly, the symmetrical, and the logical which, for them, 
represent harmony. They prize loyalty, and, so much so, that status and justice are 
intertwined49. At its most extreme point on the quadrant, the leadership is inaccessible and 
dominates from a distance. In place of persons, they exert social control through objects 
(e.g. traffic lights, drones, etc.). Analogically, even their cosmos is hierarchically-ordered. 
Types of positional cultures include bureaucracies, corporations, and the military.  
 In the bottom right quadrant, or ‘strong group, weak grid’, is the enclavist’s culture. 
This kind of society is also characterized by its intense sense of community, but there are 
no tiers as in the positionist culture. Enclavists’ moral sense causes them to reject the 
inequalities of mainstream society. Instead, an enclave is an egalitarian mode of social 
control, as paradoxical as it may sound. Here, social control arises from the enclavist’s 
black-and-white worldview where outsiders are stigmatized and, even, ‘damned’, as in the 
case  of  some  religious  sects.  It  is  this  way  of  seeing  the  world  and  all  of  its  subsequent  
outward symbols like dress code, dietary restrictions, and so on that reinforces it sharpening 
group boundaries and maintaining group membership. This lifestyle can also attract the 
disillusioned from among other types of communities. The preference for equality, though, 
makes leadership, decision-making, and resolving internal disputes a challenge. The 
enclavist has a strong tendency towards dogmatism which is used to his or her advantage 
within the community, for the doctrinally pure can claim to speak on behalf of the group 
and exercise control over his or her fellow members. Deep-seated disagreements can lead to 
factions secretly maneuvering to secure power or outright schisms where rival enclaves are 
formed. Acts of aggression from an external threat, though, increase the group’s social 
solidarity exponentially making internal dissent and factionalism look petty in comparison 
                                               
49 Sociologist Donald Black’s (1976) masterwork Behavior of Law is  superlative  in  this  regard.   Amongst  
other things, he demonstrates that in the U.S. legal system (a hierarchy) the greater the statuses differ between 
the perpetrator and the victim, the harsher the punishment, especially if the contestation of that status is 
explicitly involved.  
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(Douglas and Mars 2003). Types of enclavist cultures range from trade unions to medieval 
monastic, military orders.  
 In the lower left quadrant, or ‘weak group, weak grid’, is the individualist’s culture 
which takes the form of a free market. People are not restricted by group nor by their social 
roles; instead, social control is a product of competition. Everyone can compete; although, 
those with the most advantage are, unsurprisingly, the most dominant. According to 
Douglas, the merit-based, individualist culture “is in principle an egalitarian society, but as 
it defers to wealth and power it fails to realise its egalitarian ideals” (2007:6). As a matter 
fact, in this kind of society the further one is from these ideals the more success one will 
have. Part of this success includes having control over others even unto developing a cult-
like following. By and large, the individualist is primarily concerned with maximizing his 
or her own gains and minimizing losses. Here, I find the quintessential capitalist or the 
management guru. In Weberian terms these three cultures, the positionist, enclavist, and 
individualist, are known as ‘bureaucracy’, (religious) ‘charisma’, and ‘market’, respectively 
(ibid. 3). The last type in my diagram is one which Weber neglected to theorize about. 
While not neglected, it is the least theorized by cultural theorists including Douglas (e.g. 
Douglas and Mars 2003:769) herself because, of the four quadrants, they are the least 
participative in the political landscape. 
 In the upper left quadrant, or ‘weak group, strong grid’, is the isolate’s culture, so 
named because they are the culturally isolated; the further to the left of the quadrant they 
are the more alone. Discarded from the positionist, enclavist, and individualist cultures, 
they “attract no attention, no one asks for their opinion or takes them seriously in 
argument”, and because of this they are perceived as being apathetic (ibid. 6). Despite this 
benign  neglect  by  public  policy,  they  are  still  ruled,  albeit  remotely  (for  instance,  by  the  
leadership of a hierarchy). Thus, power, for the isolate, is unattainable, for it resides 
elsewhere. This is not just in the political sense but, by analogy, in the cosmic sense as 
well. Their cultural bias is fatalist. For them, there is no amount of rational calculation, no 
amount of cooperation, and no amount of individual skill that can control or even minimize 
the amount of uncertainty in any set of circumstances; fate overtakes us all. Some people 
might willingly go  to  this  kind  of  community  to  evade  the  social  responsibilities  in  and  
collective pressures of their own communities, but, for the most part, this is the domain of 
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the captive (prisoners, sweatshop workers, and so on) and the destitute. (Douglas 1970; 
Douglas 1999; Douglas 2007; Thompson et al. 1990).  
 From each cultural vantage point, the worldviews of the others seem irrational, but 
if a culture was irrational then, by definition, it would not be feasible. According to grid-
group analysis, all four cultures are rational. When an individual uses his or her cultural 
bias to justify his or her social relations that, in turn, substantiate the expectations raised by 
the cultural bias, it is considered rational behavior (Mamadouh 1999:397). If there are 
plural ‘rationalities’ then there is more than one ‘rational choice’ depending on the cultural 
context. Individuals can even replace one ‘rationality’ for another by their own volition, 
(abstractly) moving from one quadrant in the grid-group diagram to the next. Of course, 
they can also be moved from  one  quadrant  to  the  next  (for  example,  a  high-powered  
financier can suddenly find him- or herself completely bankrupt, going from being an 
individualist to being an isolate); this does not make it sociologically deterministic, though. 
While grid-group analysis strongly emphasizes the effect of a society’s organization on its 
members, individual freedom is not denied; it is just bounded. This is a 
phenomenologically  sound  assessment  as  well.  Anyone  who  reflects  on  his  or  her  own  
decision-making process understands that the freedom to choose is not absolute. The 
quality  and/or  quantity  of  one’s  choices  are  limited  by  his  or  her  context,  social  or  
otherwise. Moreover, the very freedom to choose may even be limited, for example, if a 
decision also requires another’s consent. Despite an individual’s capacity to change cultures 
or rationalities, the grid-group typology, in its original form, was too static and did not 
properly explain how or why such change occurred (Douglas 1999:412; Douglas 2007:6; 
Thompson et al. 1990; see, Mamadouh 1999 for a fascinating chronology of how the grid-
group typology has evolved throughout the years).  
 What was so groundbreaking about grid-group analysis, though, was Douglas’ 
addition of the enclavist and the isolate to the well-known social groupings of the time—the 
hierarchy (or positionist) and the free market (or individualist). These two dimensions 
conceptually doubled the usual dichotomy employed by social scientists then (and even 
now) widening the theoretical purview of those so interested. Another appealing feature of 
the grid-group typology is that it was not derived inductively from Douglas’ ethnographic 
observations, for doing so creates a propensity for producing classifications with categories 
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from differing criteria. This could lead to the categories not being mutually exclusive 
whereby some objects under study can fit into more than one category or jointly exhaustive 
whereby some objects under study may not fit into any categories at all. The grid-group 
typology is both mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive; it is a logically coherent 
system. (Thompson et al. 1990:13-14). I would also add that besides being logically 
coherent, grid-group analysis also has “explanatory coherence” (even if it is not the 
explanatory powerhouse that it becomes in CT). As described by cognitive scientist and 
philosopher Paul Thagard (1992) explanatory coherence has the following three criteria: 
consilience, simplicity, and analogy. Consilience means that it has explanatory range; it is 
able to explain more facts than competing. More specifically, there are two types of 
consilience that can be described as being ‘static’ or ‘dynamic’. When a theory can be used 
to evaluate all available information at the time of its inception then it is said to have “static 
consilience”. When a theory can explain more than it did when it was first formulated then 
it is said to have “dynamic consilience”. (Thagard 1992). Not only does grid-group theory 
have overall explanatory breadth, it has both types of consilience as well as I shall hope to 
show in the next section. Principally, though, it is grid-group analysis’ two additional types, 
the enclavist and the isolate, which have all but assured that this is the case (Thompson et 
al. 1990:103-104). Grid-group typology also meets the second criteria of simplicity or 
parsimony, which places limits on consilience, because it was not ad hoc; there are no 
special or superfluous categories. Lastly, the criteria of analogy, or how well the theory 
corresponds to other theories that social scientists find convincing (Thagard 1992), is 
fulfilled by grid-group analysis’ debt to the past “masters” of sociological thought, the 
mastery and further development of their ideas, and the further development of Mary 
Douglas’50 own.  
 As we have seen above, Max Weber’s three forms of rationality correspond to three 
of the four cultures. Sociologically, though, it is Emile Durkheim who has had the greatest 
impact on Mary Douglas’s work related to grid-group analysis and to the more significant 
modifications made to it in the form of CT by anthropologist Michael Thompson and 
political scientist Aaron Wildavsky with help from Richard Ellis (Thompson et al. 1990). 
Durkheim made revealing the social basis for how individuals perceive reality and its inner 
                                               
50 In my academic opinion, she was a master of sociological thought in her own right. 
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workings his lifelong project (ibid. 140). According to TEW, for him, individuals 
internalize the order of their society, including its specific perception of the world, through 
their social interactions with others. This is the only way that people would be able to share 
the classifications, such as ‘space’ and ‘time’, which make up how they perceive reality. 
These inventions that individuals have cooperatively wrought not only sustain the social 
interactions from which they came, but they also take on a life of their own. They are both 
within the individuals and outside of them as highly influential but taken for granted, social 
institutions. (ibid. 129-141). Besides Durkheim and Weber, other sociological thinkers that 
have an influence, in one way or another, on TEW’s extension of CT include Montesquieu, 
Comte, Spencer, Marx, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Parsons, Merton, Stinchcombe, and 
Elster. In this next section we shall see how Douglas’ grid-group analysis developed into 
the more dynamic cultural theory51 of Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky. 
4.1.2 To ‘cultural theory’ 
 Up  until  now  I  have  been  using  ‘culture’,  a  very  problematic  term  in  the  social  
sciences, without defining it. Following TEW, culture can be described as a “way of life” 
that is made up of a “viable” arrangement of “social relations” and “cultural bias”. Social 
relations are “patterns of interpersonal relations” while cultural bias52 deals with “shared 
values and beliefs” (Thompson et al. 1990:1). For a way of life to continue on viably it 
must instill the cultural bias, through social relations, that provides justifications53 or 
‘certainties’  for  it  in  the  members  of  that  community.  This  does  not  mean  that  social  
relations determine cultural bias or vice versa. Rather, they are interconnected and mutually 
causal54 as I described in the section above. For a set of social relations and cultural bias to 
be able to reciprocally reinforce each other, they must be compatible (TEW’s 
                                               
51 Cultural Theory is short for the ‘Theory of Sociocultural Viability’. 
52 This is similar to ‘worldview’ (from the German Weltanschauung which means ‘a view of the world’). In 
general, cultural anthropologists, philosophers, psychologists, and religious studies scholars agree that a 
worldview is a way of thinking about and interpreting the world (Johnson, Hill, and Cohen 2011:143). While 
some scholars believe that there can be individual and group worldviews (refer to Johnson et al. 2011 for 
more information), extending the logic of CT, an individual could not have a ‘private’ cognitive bias because 
bias of any kind is not only embedded in but also embedded by a socio-cultural context.  
53 Explicit justifications also act as implicit criticisms of an opposing argument as rhetoricians and social 
psychologists have demonstrated (e.g. Billig [1987]1996; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958]1971). In the 
case above, the ‘opposing argument’ represents a competing way of life. 
54  For  TEW, CT is  not  designed to  get  at  the  origins  of  ways  of  life  but  to  understand how these  primary  
cultural forms, after having come about, endure and transform (Thompson et al. 1990:1). 
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“compatibility condition”, ibid. 2). It is not only a way of life that indoctrinates individuals, 
for if members of a community want to live a certain way they must settle on those values 
and  beliefs  (i.e.,  the  cultural  bias)  that  can  sustain  that  way  of  life  (ibid.).  Individuals  
indoctrinate each other and, by choosing which set of doctrines to abide by, indoctrinate 
themselves. Regardless of the means by which a cultural bias is propagated, the bias of one 
culture must be defined against the bias of its antagonist culture in order for its members 
“to know who they are and what they stand for” (Douglas 1999:413). In addition, because 
of  its  specific  shortcomings  a  way  of  life  requires  the  other  ways  of  life  to  continuously  
amend it. One way they do this is by making and breaking alliances with each other 
(Thompson et al. 1990:86-93). To put it succinctly, they all need each other. This is TEW’s 
“requisite variety condition” (ibid. 4). This leads us to TEW’s “impossibility theorem” that 
states that there are only five55 ways of life (a fifth one found in the very center of the grid-
group diagram that will be discussed later), no more and no less (ibid. 3). Hence, for TEW 
the five ways of life must always be present in any society. While the four ways of life vie 
for or attempt to maintain their dominance relative to each, the fifth way of life retreats 
from the power struggles. The continuous conflict between the cultures creates a state of 
“permanent dynamic imbalance”. That is, a state that is stable through change, which keeps 
them from becoming too rigid and totally shattering when faced with the aggregate effect of 
all manners of uncertainty and adversity. (See Thompson et al. 1990:83–100 for the variety 
of ways this comes about). As Douglas (1999:413; 2007:8) acknowledged, this competition 
between the ways of life is one of the main advances that has helped introduce the much 
needed element of dynamism into her theory. In my understanding one of the other main 
advances to Douglas’ grid-group analysis is TEW’s explanation for how and why change 
comes about in a society. They do this via their “theory of surprise”, which is composed of 
three axioms.  
 The first axiom is that “[a]n event is never surprising in itself”. The second axiom is 
that “[i]t is potentially surprising only in relation to a particular set of convictions about 
how the world is.” The third axiom is that “[i]t is actually surprising only if it is noticed by 
the holder of that particular set of convictions.” (Thompson et al. 1990:70).  In other words, 
                                               
55 I am in agreement with Mary Douglas (and Nowacki) that CT’s five ways of life should be seen as a useful 
analytical tool rather than the only feasible possibility (Nowacki 2004:342). 
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‘surprise’ is socially constructed56. TEW also present a “typology of surprises” as seen 
below (Table 4.2). Each myth is understood according to what it is not, in other words, the 
other rival myths. 
 
Table 4.2: A typology of surprises (After Thompson et al. 1990:71) 
 
Actual world 
 
Stipulated world 
 
 
I 
Capricious 
 
II 
Ephemeral 
 
III 
Benign 
 
IV 
Perverse/ 
Tolerant 
 
I 
Capricious 
(Isolate’s myth) 
 
 
  
Expected 
windfalls don’t 
happen 
 
Unexpected runs 
of good luck 
 
Unexpected runs 
of good luck and 
bad luck 
 
II 
Ephemeral 
(Enclavist’s myth) 
 
 
Caution does not 
work 
  
Others prosper 
 
Others prosper 
 
III 
Benign 
(Individualist’s 
myth) 
 
 
Skill is not 
rewarded 
 
Total collapse 
  
Partial collapse 
 
IV 
Perverse/ 
Tolerant 
(Positionist’s 
myth) 
 
Unpredictability 
 
Total collapse 
 
Competition 
 
 
TEW  argue  that  people  try  to  rationalize  those  ideas  or  events  that  do  not  fit  the  
expectations of their own way of life; this makes ways of life quite conservative, resilient to 
novelty and change. Eventually, though, a continuous barrage of surprises, or “the 
cumulative mismatches between expectation and result”, will initiate a rupture that requires 
a serious change to be made (Thompson et al. 1990:80). This coming apart of a culture can 
occur at the level of individuals whereby they migrate to another way of life that offers a 
better explanation for a surprising event. It can also occur at the level of the culture itself. 
                                               
56 Of course, there is the “startle response”, a physiological reaction to sudden stimuli like a loud noise or 
quick movement, which is related to the emotion that we, in lay terms, call ‘surprise’. Individually this 
reaction might lead to various responses. (Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert 1990). I argue, in line with CT, that 
these responses are socioculturally conditioned. 
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When the latter happens, one way of life, being wholly rejected by its onetime adherents, 
will convert into the opposing way of life57. (ibid. 69–81). An example of an extreme 
changeover could be the French Revolution. Put simply, before the revolution the French 
lived in a rigid hierarchy whose tiers were represented by the 'estates” with the monarchy 
sitting atop the highest estate (a positionist way of life). The revolutionaries wanted to 
abolish  the  estate  system  for  a  more  communal  system  (an  enclavist  way  of  life).  The  
bloodthirsty among them did so under the gleam of the guillotine. Most changeovers need 
not occur so violently, though; the ‘revolutions’ (e.g. the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia, the 
‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine, and perhaps the ‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt) of the 21st 
century are case in point58.   
 These propositions—the compatibility condition, the impossibility theorem, 
requisite variety condition, and the theory of surprise—further develop the “explanatory 
coherence”, in Thagard’s words, of Douglas’ grid-group analysis. While CT is not without 
its controversies, it makes for a powerful explanatory theory. Grid-group analysis/CT has 
been applied by diverse disciplines besides anthropology, sociology, and political science 
to study a litany of concepts, polities, policies, and so on (see e.g. Mamadouh 1999 and 
Verweij et al. 2011 for some of the ways CT has been put to use). Even so, my plan is to 
employ CT as a heuristic device the way Mary Douglas originally designed grid-group 
analysis to function (e.g. Douglas 1978; Mamadouh 1999:396). 
 Before we go into TEW’s elaboration of the grid-group, let us briefly reiterate some 
main points. CT not only tries to explain how people attempt to achieve their goals but also 
why  they  prefer  what  they  prefer  (as  TEW  contend,  this  separates  CT  from  other  social  
scientific theories59 of this sort). They go about this by asserting that in order to give 
meaning to their lives in an uncertain world people arrange themselves into five types of 
social organization, which are upheld by particular patterns and processes, to make 
meaningfulness possible. “[A]s people organize so they will behave” (ibid. 97, italics in 
                                               
57 This reminds me of the symbol of the Taodejing (???) or the yin-yang made up of opposites (black-
white) that do not oppose but rather complement each other as a mutual whole. When one side reaches its 
extreme, it flips becoming its reverse. (e.g. Combs 2000). 
58 Although it could be argued that in many of the cases violence of some sort related to the revolutions 
occurred after the fact. The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and current clashes between Muslims and Christians 
in Egypt are two instances. 
59 It is also a better predictor of people’s preferences and biases than other alternatives (Verweij et al. 
2011:476)  
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original). These social organizations are analyzed using the two dimensions of Douglas’ 
typology, grid and group. The grid dimension refers to the extent of the rules.  The group 
dimension refers to how tightly the group is integrated. Thompson (1982), one the of the 
collaborators on CT, added a third dimension he called “grip”, which refers to the amount 
of manipulation (or as Douglas puts it, the “dimension of power” 2007:8) involved in each 
quadrant. In CT this third dimension does not add any new cultural configurations and is 
implicitly included in the theory so I will only discuss it briefly and use it to segue into a 
short  introduction  of  the  fifth,  and  possible  sixth,  ways  of  life.  Table  4.3  below  portrays  
Thompson’s three dimensional model.  
 
Table 4.3: The third dimension of the grid-group diagram: ‘Grip’ or manipulation (Source: 
Mamadouh 1999:401 after Thompson 1982) 
 
 
Starting from the leftmost square, the top left quadrant that Thompson labels 
“survival individualist” is where the isolate goes while in the bottom right quadrant that he 
labels “survival collectivist” is where the enclavist goes. Their level of manipulation is -1 
which simply means that instead of manipulating they are manipulated; they use an 
individualist or collectivist strategy to ‘survive’. If I shift my attention to the rightmost 
square, I can see that the top right quadrant is labeled “manipulative collectivist” which is 
where the positionist goes; positionists manipulate by prescribing more rules. While the 
bottom left quadrant is labeled “manipulative individualist” which is where the 
individualist goes; individualists manipulate by building a network in which they are the 
central node. The labels make it obvious what these two cultures’ modus operandi is in this 
dimension. Taken together, manipulation can be used as a means to ensure that one 
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exchanges or does not exchange one culture for another. The fifth culture is not 
manipulated nor does it want to manipulate so has a manipulation “score” of zero. These 
people are the truly autonomous; thus, this way of life is labeled “autonomy” (which I re-
label as “autonomist” for lexical continuity). 
Autonomists abide in the very midpoint of all four quadrants. Having retreated from 
all four ways of life, they are free from both group demands and behavioral regulations. 
Because of this they must improvise everything, but they are satisfied living off the land. 
The recluse is an example of this fifth way of life (Douglas 2007:8; Thompson et al. 1990).  
 Some (e.g. Nowacki 2004) have argued for a sixth “philosophical” way of life in 
contradistinction to CT’s “impossibility theorem” that posits that there are only five 
possible ways of life. Sociologically akin to the autonomist but “socially engaged”, the 
philosopher’s way of life employs a “[c]ritical rationality...that it is willing to put all of its 
principles and presuppositions into question” in order to attain truth including his or her 
view of nature, which the autonomist is unwilling to do (ibid. 337 italics in original).  
This is a reflective social being that is outside the four quadrants altogether because it 
cannot be reduced to them yet can ruminate on CT as a whole. (Nowacki 2004). 
Accordingly, that could place all of those individuals that are able to write about CT in the 
theoretical  section of their  master’s theses,  for example,  into this wisdom-seeking way of 
life. Nevertheless, the ability to philosophize on occasion does not make one a philosopher.  
 This brings us to CT’s assumption that people have “multiple selves”. Basically, it 
means that because their social context is not consistent (one might be an individualist at 
work,  a  positionist  at  home,  an  enclavist  at  church,  and  an  isolate  when one  cheers  for  a  
sports team that is known for losing) people must make ‘coalitions’ within themselves of 
these various ways of life in which they repeatedly come in contact. The same thing must 
also occur in society as a whole in order to function smoothly. In this way, individuals are 
“self-contained regime[s]”. (Thompson et al. 1990:265–67). Once again, this idea has a 
very Durkheimian flavor who, in Mary Douglas’ words, thought of the “individual mind 
furnished as society writ small” (1986:45). If what TEW, Douglas, and Durkheim say is so 
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then, the ways of life and their relationships to each other should appear ‘fractally’60 at 
every level of observation whether at the ‘macro’ level of the whole system or the ‘micro’ 
level of an individual’s mind or the ‘meso’ level of anything in between, for no matter what 
level one looks at it will look ‘self-similar’, in other words, the same from near as from far. 
From society to the individual mind, everything is structured by the social, the cultural. 
Even nature and, by extension, human nature are not perceived how they really are but 
rather through the lens of one’s cultural bias; that is, they are socially constructed. 
4.1.2.1 The sociocultural construction of nature and human nature  
 Below is the well-known diagram of the four “myths of nature” nested in the grid-
group typology that has become a mainstay of CT (e.g. Mamadouh 1999:403).  
 
Table 4.4: The four rationalities and the myths of nature 
 
                                               
60 For the use of fractals as heuristic devices in the social sciences see Abbott’s (2004) Methods of 
Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences. For the use of fractals to describe the nature of the social 
sciences see Abbott’s (2000) The Chaos of Disciplines.  
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The myths of nature are “partial representations of reality” because they “capture some 
essence of experience and wisdom”. Still, they act “as self-evident truth to the particular 
social being whose way of life is premised on nature conforming to that version of reality”. 
In this way, the myths are both true and false which has allowed them to stand the test of 
time. (Thompson et al. 1990:26). As expected, there are five myths, though only four are 
shown in the chart above. The diagram represents the relationship between individual or 
group life represented as the ball in the natural world depicted as a landscape of curved, 
straight, or wavy lines.  
 Working my way clockwise, I begin with the upper right hand corner labeled ‘the 
hierarchist’ (or positionist). They see nature as ‘perverse/tolerant’ meaning that it can cope 
with most events; the shape of the ‘hills’ will ensure that the ball will return to the ‘valley’ 
where it is in equilibrium. Still, it is susceptible to sporadic events that can send the ball 
over the edge into chaos. In order to be able to predict when these events can occur and 
manage them, experts should be given the authority they need to keep us out of harm's way, 
or so the cultural bias goes. In the lower right hand corner labeled ‘the egalitarian’ (or 
enclavist) are those that see nature as ‘ephemeral’. Here, nature is fragile and should be 
treated with the utmost care, for any perturbation might send the ball over the hill, the 
ecosystem into a catastrophic collapse. This myth justifies the use of sanctions to curb 
behavior destructive to nature and encourages us all to live in kibbutzim. Adjacent to this 
quadrant is the individualist who sees nature as ‘benign’. Nature is durable in that it can 
take all manners of shocking events; for them the ball will always roll to the bottom where 
it belongs. This myth justifies their trial and error experimentation and even a level of laxity 
in how they behave in the natural environment otherwise. Above this quadrant, in the upper 
left hand corner labeled ‘the fatalist’ (or isolate) people see nature as ‘capricious’. Theirs is 
a world filled with randomness. All they can do is cope to the best of their abilities when 
unpredictable events occur, but whether they die, survive, or thrive is the luck of the draw. 
It  does  not  matter  which  way  the  balls  goes  on  the  landscape;  it  is  all  the  same  to  the  
isolate. Finally, the autonomist, in the center of the diagram, views nature as ‘resilient’. For 
them there is no distinction between the ball and the landscape, life and the world, 
humanity and nature; there is no duality only ‘oneness’ with the natural world that provides 
their sustenance. Theirs is a ‘meta-myth’, for it envelops the other four myths each of 
 44 
 
which are viewed as a phase in a never-ending cycle of change. By withdrawing from the 
social world and its constant power struggles, autonomists believe they can “transcend the 
other ways of life” but, in actuality, all they do is “bias themselves away from them” 
(Thompson et al. 1990:32). The four other myths must be reflected on in order to rationally 
choose the autonomist way of life, thus enacting their cultural bias. (ibid. 26-33). Mary 
Douglas (1996:88-89) developed human nature analogs based on the myths of nature. Her 
labels61 are a bit different from Thompson and his colleagues’, but they are consistent and 
cohere to CT. 
For positionists, humans are “born sinful but can be redeemed by good institutions” 
(Thompson et al. 1990:35). For enclavists, humans are “basically good but [their] nature is 
highly susceptible to institutional influences” (ibid. 36). For individualists, humans do not 
change; they are and always will be self-seeking. While, for isolates, humans are so 
changeable  that  they  should  be  looked  upon  with  suspicion.  In  a  way,  this  justifies  their  
exclusion  from  the  other  ways  of  life.  For  the  autonomist,  withdrawal  from  the  ‘human  
natures’ is of the essence, leaving behind the desires that stimulate the individuals in the 
other ways of life. (Thompson et al. 1990:33-37). Both nature and human nature, or rather 
the perception of nature and human nature, are socially constructed, according to CT. The 
different cultural biases get at a truth about each of them, but even if I take all five types of 
biases as a whole I can never get to the Truth about nature and human nature.  
 All there is, then, is the belief about what is true. These are not just any beliefs, 
however; they do not appear ex nihilo from within the mind of an individual but, rather, are 
grounded, as should be expected from a sociological perspective, in one’s social context62. 
For Douglas, the knowledge that I acquire is deep-rooted in my culture; hers is a 
“sociological epistemology”, a way of trying to understand the nature of knowledge that is 
situated  in  the  social.  “[I]ndividuals  really  do  share  their  thoughts  and  they  do  to  some  
extent harmonize their preferences, and they have no other way to make the big decisions 
[about life and death] except within the scope of [the ways of life in which they dwell, the] 
                                               
61 For her ‘nature/person robust within limits’ represents the positionist, ‘nature/person nature fragile’ or 
‘nature under duress’ represents the enclavist, ‘nature/person robust’ represents the individualist, and 
‘nature/person unpredictable’ represents the isolate (Douglas 1996:88-89; Mamadouh 1999:403). 
62 For TEW this is a “constrained relativism”, a middle ground between “realists” and “relativists” 
(Thompson et al. 1990:25). 
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institutions they build” (Douglas 1986:128). This, for her, is how institutions ‘think’. But 
what do they think about? In a word, control.  
4.1.3 Information control systems 
Institutions, as parts of a way of life or a whole way of life itself, can be described 
as  “information  control  systems”.  In  other  words,  systems  enact  social  control  via  the  
control of information63. According to Douglas and Mars (2003), before people can 
communicate information it must go through a systemic process. It must first be designated 
as information from background noise. Next, the degree of dependability, the 
trustworthiness of the source, for example, must be deliberated on. Following this, people 
must incorporate the new information as meaningful “patterns that best seem to serve their 
purposes” into an already existing knowledge base64 (ibid. 765). It is through this process 
that “people create the institutions they live in...burrowing into a mountain of noise”. (ibid. 
765-766). Our environment (or life or reality or however one wants to put it) is so utterly 
complex that we can only have incomplete information about it. In order to make some 
sense of it based on this incomplete information, people form ways of life or institutions 
that give meaning to it though the rest remains ‘noise’. Following the ‘burrow’ metaphor, 
Douglas and her colleague Mars re-describe three of the four ways of life as animal 
domiciles, the shapes of which depict how they are organized socially.  
They begin by comparing isolates to hares because hares are solitary creatures that 
do not burrow (unlike their cousins, the rabbits). They live their lives out in the open. While 
this may sound more like an autonomist who has decided to live on the  slope  of  the  
                                               
63 From the perspective of Claude E. Shannon’s ‘information theory’, information can be delineated from its 
indeterminate surroundings (background noise such as interference and static) as some ratio of signal to noise 
and compressed to reduce complexity all the while approximating the message as closely as possible 
mathematically. This was to be done by adjusting patterns of redundancy and frequency based on statistical 
findings in order to adapt a signal so that it stands out maximally against noise during transmission. Before 
information can even be sent, though, a channel of some sorts needs to be cleared to make contact with the 
receiver and maintain it; it is a physical process. This is the minimal state of communication. According to 
Shannon’s theory, then, communication consists of structural and material issues not semiotic and meaning-
based ones63. (e.g. Terranova 2004). Cyberneticians also agree that any time information is communicated it 
is an attempt at control over the perturbations of an unstable physical environment (e.g. Terranova 2004:69). 
This is the other side of the coin, so to speak.  
64 An excellent theory for attempting to understand this phenomenon is social psychologist Serge 
Moscovici’s (e.g. 2000) “theory of social representations” which proposes how a novel and unfamiliar 
concept (e.g. ‘the butterfly effect’) or event (e.g. the formation of the European Union) is transformed into 
familiar, conventional knowledge. 
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‘mountain of noise’ rather than in it, the metaphor is supposed to capture that they do not 
‘dig out’ their own burrows. In terms of information, what isolates receive is regulated from 
afar. For them, little information is shared because members of this kind of community 
rarely relate to each other. Because little of it is shared, it is not substantiated nor 
synchronized with what others’ know. Thus, they are limited in their ability to form 
institutions of their own. 
Individualists (here called ‘opportunists’) are compared to rabbits but a kind who 
continually reconstruct their warren, a network of burrows that branch out from a center. 
This center is where information is concentrated. As I mentioned before, a dominant (i.e. 
successful) individualist is one that can gather other individuals around him or her. As a 
source of information, a center is created around them. In the constant contests for 
dominance, ‘superstars’ rise and fall, centers develop and expand or deteriorate and 
contract. Information is free to create, to share, and to receive so anyone can make an 
attempt at ‘superstardom’. Still, there must be some intersubjective agreement for the 
information to be considered acceptable. For the most part, the superstar’s word is ‘gospel’. 
If  a  superstar  decides  to  consolidate  power  into  something  more  formal  then  this  kind  of  
social organization can be combined with a hierarchy or even an enclave but each at 
different levels of the organization. 
Positionists (here called ‘hierarchies’) are compared to ants as they are highly 
coordinated. Each sector within the anthill accommodates a specific class (the queen, the 
soldiers, the workers, and so on) and passageways between these sectors are clearly 
marked. In terms of information control, not every sector is accessible to everyone; security 
protocols are always in effect. Instead, information is allotted according to the roles one 
occupies in society. Furthermore, the flow of unconventional information coming from 
within is impeded while unfamiliar information coming from outside is screened. Because 
censorship is high and secrecy is enforced, ambiguity is low; one receives just enough 
information to fulfill one’s function in society. For those that resist this structure, 
punishment is doled out by barring the resistant from the information that they require for 
their livelihood or to move up-tier. 
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Enclavists (here called ‘enclaves’) are not compared to any animal’s domicile65 and 
their subsequent social organization66. In any case, as an information control system, the 
enclave protects itself from external sources of information, even with an authoritarian-
style censorship if need be. Unlike the positionist’s hierarchy, the lack of well-defined roles 
means that informational ambiguity is high, despite the strong censorship. Once 
information from outside is filtered, as it inevitably must be to prevent ‘contamination’, the 
individuals within the enclave contend over its proper interpretation. Factions can then 
form, many times clandestinely, around those with the ‘correct’ interpretation. At the level 
of information-generation (or internal sources of information) secrecy can also be used as a 
tool of control (and faction-creation) separating those that know the secret(s) or aspects of 
the secret(s) from those that do not. (Douglas and Mars 2003:766-769). Below (Table 4.5)  
is the grid-group with information as its focus. 
 
Table 4.5: A cultural theory of information (After Douglas and Mars 2003) 
 
strong grid, weak group 
 
ISOLATES 
Individuals insulated 
Information regulated from afar 
Little information distributed, verified, coordinated 
 
 
strong group, strong grid  
 
POSITIONISTS 
Roles prescribed 
Information censored, partitioned, stabilized 
Minimum ambiguity 
Secrecy used for control 
 
 
weak grid, weak group 
 
INDIVIDUALISTS 
No censorship 
Superstar generates information  
Information subject to fashions 
Secrecy disapproved 
Information hoarded to be allocated strategically 
 
 
strong group, weak grid 
 
ENCLAVISTS 
Outside sources censored 
Information partitioned by factions 
Maximum ambiguity 
Secrecy used for control 
 
 
For sociologist Alan Scott (2009), Georg Simmel’s ‘sociology of secret societies’ 
implies a ‘cultural theory of organization’ similar to Douglas’. Simmel (1906) demonstrates 
                                               
65 Unless they decide to organize themselves as a hierarchy nested within an enclave (the example given is of 
the Mormons); then they could be described in terms of the anthill (Douglas and Mars, 2003: 768). 
66 Perhaps this is because Douglas and Mars focus on enclaves specifically and want to move away from a 
more metaphorical and abstract description to a more literal and concrete explanation that could have policy 
implications. 
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that ‘the secret’ is a variety of social relationship based on mutual trust. There are groups 
for which ‘the secret’ acts as the underlying principle of their organization, namely ‘secret 
societies’. From Simmel’s analysis of secret societies Scott deduces that they could be 
organized as both a hierarchy (positionist) and an enclave (enclavist) or both a hierarchy 
and a network (individualist)67. (Scott 2009:275-279). How ways of life are allied in secret 
societies, for instance, could be akin to how ways of life are allied in national political 
cultures68. For example, Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands could be described as an 
alliance of a hierarchical (positionist) and egalitarian (enclavist) ways of life69 while  the  
United Kingdom could be described as an alliance of a hierarchical (positionist) and 
individualist ways of life (Mamadouh 1997).  
While the four cultures are recast by Douglas and Mars using the metaphor of 
‘information control systems’, ‘knowledge’ is in the background. According to organization 
theorist Philippe Baumard ([1996]2001: 20), “[i]nformation is but a medium to initiate and 
formalize knowledge”, which is the organization’s foremost role. This is consistent with the 
process, described in CT, by which information is demarcated from background noise, 
audited for consumption, and integrated into culturally-appropriate knowledge70. According 
to CT, it is through this knowledge that social control is enacted in its cultural specifics. 
Following this logic, knowledge, instead of information, is actually central. Perhaps, the 
cultures might better be called ‘knowledge control systems71’.  
As I mentioned in section 2.2, one of the main processes taken by social scientists 
for eliciting abductive reasoning and gain new insights is moving between the data and 
theory. This is the basic procedure for my results below. 
5 Results  
Before I go into the results proper I would like to point out some of the clues in the 
content and form of the text that had me initiate an inquiry into the question of ‘culture’ in 
                                               
67 And, I would conjecture, some other configurations as well. 
68 Thus, CT can applied from the individuals with ‘multiple selves’ (not to be confused with ‘multiple 
personality disorder’) to nation-states (e.g. Mamadouh 1999; Thompson et al. 1990) 
69 I would conjecture that Finland probably falls into this category.   
70 From the perspective of CT, knowledge, as it is derived from information, is inevitably constituted by 
uncertain stuff. 
71 This reminds me of Michel Foucault’s ‘knowledge/power’. It would be interesting to work through how 
they might be related. 
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the Art of War. Being that it is a military treatise, it may seem obvious that its biases would 
be firmly entrenched in the positionist culture, for the military is the hierarchical 
organization par excellence.  Still,  as  Mair  points  out,  while  “[t]he  hierarchy  of  
organizational levels in the army is alluded to in the Sun Zi”  it  is  “not  discussed  in  
detail…[for] the authors of the Sun Zi…were preoccupied with more theoretical, political, 
and psychological aspects of war”  (2007:20-21). This may simply be because the how-to 
of administering an army was already covered in other known works of the time (for 
example, a now-lost treatise called Army Administration the Sun Zi quotes in chapter 7). 
There  seems  to  be  more  to  the  lack  of  explicit  emphasis  on  strict  hierarchy  than  that,  
though. For example, after receiving his mandate from the ruler a general has the right to 
follow those orders or not depending on whether he feels it is a prudent course of action 
(Sun Zi trans Mair 2007:115). In a traditional hierarchy this could not be possible. Another 
clue that the Art of War is not promoting a positionist way of life in particular involves the 
use of spies in chapter 13.  While spies are crucial  to the war effort,  they are not soldiers; 
therefore, they lie outside of the army’s hierarchical structure. Besides clues in the content, 
if one considers the composite nature and, consequentially, the loose arrangement or form 
of the text the potential for more than one culture’s biases also arises. In this way the Art of 
War might actually represent a collage of cultural biases. These are issues that require a 
deeper look if one’s goals is to comprehend the culture ‘found’ in the text. This calls for 
certain steps to be taken first. 
In order to move between the Art of War and Cultural Theory abductively I first had 
to organize all of the information I had available about the ‘four cultures’ into a more 
helpful format, a chart, which as Mills finds is “a genuine tool of production” (1959:213). 
While in the process of organizing the information into a chart, gaps in the information 
became apparent. This required me to deduce the missing information from the literature 
reviewed. It also allowed me the opportunity to cross-check the consistency of some of the 
previous theorizing in CT and make adjustments where needed. Some other heuristic 
devices were also implemented. For example, I thought through some of the more abstract 
statements given by scholars (e.g. Douglas and Mars 2003) by imagining how they might 
play out in a more concrete sense as suggested by Jaccard and Jacoby (2009:56). I also 
followed the logic of a proposition to its most extreme outcome as promoted by both Mills 
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(1959:213-214) and Jaccard and Jacoby (2009:58). Once the chart (Table 5.1) was 
completed, I used it as a checklist (highlighting concepts in red) to see which culture or 
cultures could be represented by the Art of War. Finally, I went to the text to find evidence 
for my conjectures. The results of this uncomplicated but effective ‘method’ reveal that the 
Art of War is comprised of a hybrid culture somewhere between the positionist and 
individualist cultures on the grid-group typology.  
 
 
Table 5.1: The Four Cultures 
 
(Based on Douglas 1978, 1996, 1999, 2007; Douglas and Mars 2003; Hood 1998; 
Mamadouh 1999; Thompson 1982; Thompson et al. 1990) 
 
*Information deduced from the literature 
**Highlighted concepts indicate possible link to the Sun Zi 
 
Label Isolate Individualist Positionist 
 
Enclavist 
 
Grid-group strong grid,  
weak group 
weak grid,  
weak group 
strong group, 
strong grid  
strong group,  
weak grid 
Examples prisoners, 
sweatshop workers,  
the destitute 
free markets, 
social networks 
 
bureaucracies, 
corporations , 
the military 
trade unions,  
monastic orders, 
kibbutzim 
Underlying 
principle and key 
value 
fate and survival competition and 
gains (wealth and 
power) 
 
traditional order 
and  loyalty 
black-and-white 
thinking and 
equality 
 
 
View of nature  nature as 
‘capricious’ and 
random 
nature as ‘benign’ 
and durable  
nature as ‘perverse’ 
and ‘tolerant’  
 
nature as 
‘ephemeral’ and 
fragile  
View of human 
nature 
unstable, worthy of 
suspicion 
always self-seeking 
 
born sinful but 
redeemable by  
‘good institutions’ 
basically good but 
susceptible to 
corruption by 
institutions 
Internal conflict 
resolution 
*outside 
intervention 
*‘one on one’ 
either face-to-face 
or via some media 
outlet so long as 
there is an audience 
or indirectly via 
cheating and 
deception 
high level of 
classification and 
various strategies 
for re-classifying  
real or supposed 
external threat, 
otherwise very 
challenging 
Source(s) of 
information 
whatever happens 
to come from 
authorities, while 
the rest is 
‘superstar’ 
generates 
information, thus 
subject to fashions 
*top-down and 
tradition-based 
*doctrinal texts, 
insider 
interpretations 
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unfounded or just 
not shared 
 
 
Information 
regulation 
information 
regulated from afar, 
for  
insufficient 
information limits 
ability to form own 
institutions 
no censorship; 
intersubjective 
agreement required 
to gain acceptance; 
information 
hoarded by 
‘superstar’ to be 
allocated 
strategically 
information 
censored, 
stabilized, 
apportioned 
according to 
prescribed roles; 
information access 
used for reward and 
punishment 
outside sources 
censored, 
information filtered 
and interpreted,  
partitioned by 
factions 
Quality of meaning *maximum 
ambiguity 
 
 
*moderate 
ambiguity (just 
enough to keep 
people talking 
about the 
‘superstar’) 
minimum 
ambiguity 
 
maximum 
ambiguity 
 
Secrecy *either there are 
‘no’ secrets 
because of constant 
surveillance or 
secrets are 
disregarded as 
insignificant 
secrecy 
disapproved (*at 
least officially, 
effective ‘hoarding’ 
requires security 
measures) 
 
secrecy used for 
control  
 
secrecy used for 
control 
 
Manipulation ‘survival 
individualist’ 
‘manipulative 
individualist’ 
‘manipulative 
collectivist’ 
‘survival 
collectivist’72  
At culture’s 
extreme 
*severely 
oppressed by an 
authoritarian or 
totalitarian regime 
with no popular 
resistance to speak 
of 
cult-like following 
with positionist or 
enclavist 
tendencies 
leadership 
inaccessible, 
dominates from a 
distance where, in 
place of persons, 
social control is 
exerted through 
objects  
*utopian goals of 
equality ‘justify’ 
repressive regime 
and mass purging  
 
Not surprised 
when… 
caution does not 
work, skill is not 
rewarded, and 
events are 
unpredictable 
there are 
unexpected runs of 
good luck, others 
prosper, and 
competition is rife 
there are 
unexpected runs of 
good luck and bad 
luck, others 
prosper, and when 
there is a partial 
collapse 
expected windfalls 
don’t happen and 
when there is total 
collapse 
Game metaphor 
(Hood, 1989: 187) 
game of chance 
like roulette 
individual game of 
skill like chess 
captained game 
like American 
football 
non-captained, 
noncompetitive, 
team sport like folk 
dancing 
 
 While elements of the positionist rationality figure strongly in the Art of War as 
they would in a military treatise, this is not necessarily the underlying cultural principle that 
drives some of its key features such as the use of spying. I would argue that that distinction 
                                               
72 From the perspective of an outside threat (especially if it’s from mainstream society) enclavists could be 
seen as ‘survival collectivists’, but what about the use of censorship and secrecy to control information?  
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actually goes to the individualist culture. The most decisive factor in the text that 
demonstrates how the military hierarchy shifts from its base in traditional order to one 
nested within an individualist rationality concerns relationships, more specifically, the 
relationships between a general and a ruler, a general and his spies, and a general and the 
populace.  
 In a positionist culture a sovereign, or other leader of some sort, is considered the 
top of the societal ‘pyramid’. The Sun Zi seems to argue that war is a time where normative 
social structures are suspended for the sake of state security; this includes the ‘place’ of the 
ruler. While a general receives his mandate from the sovereign to face their enemies in 
battle, once this mandate is received the relationship between the general and the ruler takes 
a different turn. A general should be aware that there are three ways that a ruler can 
undermine his own military capabilities and, basically, hand victory over to his enemies. 
Firstly, if a ruler calls for an advance or retreat without understanding whether the army 
could actually advance or retreat, he ‘hobbles’ it. Secondly, if a ruler attempts to administer 
the army, which has its own code, according to the protocols of the state, he arouses 
confusion. Thirdly, if a ruler attempts to supervise the officers and troops without 
understanding their suitability, he arouses doubts. When the army is rife with confusion and 
doubt the neighboring rulers will take notice and attempt to take advantage of the situation. 
(Sun Zi trans. Mair 2007:86). Therefore, it is the general’s prerogative to obey or disobey 
the ruler’s orders depending on whether the general finds them conducive to winning a 
battle or not (ibid. 115, also 106). Despite the circumstances of wartime, this could be seen 
as a serious affront to a sovereign’s rule. Furthermore, not only does the general have the 
right to follow the ruler’s explicit instructions, or not, he also has the right to follow other 
laws and customs (conceivably, those also instated by previous rulers), or not. One telling 
example comes from chapter 11, one of the core chapters of the work, where Sun Zi advises 
that a general should “offer rewards that exceed legal limits, deliver orders [for meritorious 
service] that go beyond administrative norms” in order to unify his forces into “a single 
man” (ibid. 123). In this manner, a general is following the dao or the ‘way’73, which in 
chapter 1 refers to that which unifies the ruler and the people (ibid. 77) but here refers to 
                                               
73 As previously stated the ‘way’ (dao) here does not refer to a metaphysical concept but concerns more 
practical matters; so it cannot be argued that Sun Zi is advocating a more ‘spiritual-minded’ general. 
 53 
 
the general and his troops. The general follows the ‘way’ but at the expense of legal and 
customary practices. Again, this could be seen as a serious affront to a sovereign’s rule. It 
also seems paradoxical in light of the fact that the Sun Zi also  states  that  “[h]e  who  is  
skilled at waging war cultivates the way and protects the law” (ibid. 90, my italics). 
Understood from the positionist culture, these statements are definitely at odds because 
laws, which have the appearance of being impartial, are actually meant to reify and 
reinforce the traditional way of life that already binds the people and their  ruler,  in other 
words, the hierarchical social structure and the people’s places within it. For one deep-
rooted in the positionist culture any other way of life is basically unthinkable. On the other 
hand, if seen from an individualist cultural perspective, these statements are not 
paradoxical. I would argue that in both cases where a general does not comply with either 
the ruler’s orders or the rule of law it is because the logic of victory supersedes the logic of 
tradition and order. That is, the underlying cultural principle is not that of the positionist but 
rather that of the individualist. 
 The relationship between the general and spies also provides another example of 
how an individualist cultural logic overtakes a positionist one in the Art of War. This occurs 
in two instances. The first instance concerns ‘foreknowledge’. Foreknowledge cannot be 
gained by traditional means, e.g. various forms of divination or even classical Chinese 
argumentation74, especially in regards to knowing one’s opponent as emphasized at the end 
of chapters 3 (ibid. 87) and 10 (ibid. 116). Instead, the sort of foreknowledge from which 
action that will lead to victory can be taken originates from first-rate espionage (ibid. 131). 
Here, the Art of War makes a sharp break with the past. The second instance of the 
predominance of individualist cultural logic involves the spies themselves. As I mentioned 
previously, because spies are not soldiers they are not part of the hierarchical structure of 
the military, yet there is nowhere in the text that explicitly mentions how spies would be 
incorporated into the overall military scheme. Once again turning to chapter 11, however, 
we find that a general should “stupefy [the] eyes and ears of officers and troops” in order to 
hide the preparation and implementation of tactics, stratagems, and overall strategy (ibid. 
121; see also Mair 2007:157, n.19 and 20). Following this logic, this implies that spies, 
                                               
74 Analogy is explicitly mentioned in the Sun Zi, but other forms of classical Chinese argumentation that 
could also be included are argument from authority, argument by historical example, and argument from 
ritualistic practices, to name but a few (see Liu 2007). 
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who provide the key information on which these decisions will be based, should be directly 
answerable to the general. Once more, we find the general working outside the bounds of 
the seemingly dominant positionist culture. This is permissible, though, in light of 
individualist rationality since the end goal of quality espionage is victory (ibid. 129), the 
individualist’s core value.  
 How the Art of  War depicts the relationship between the general and the populace 
even further underscores that the individualist cultural logic is its principal logic. It is the 
general, not the ruler, that is called the ‘buttress’ (or ‘protector’, according to Griffith’s 
translation) of the state (ibid.  86).  As I  have shown above, aside from protecting the state 
from its enemies, a capable general must also protect the state from the military 
incompetence  of  its  own  ruler  even  if  it  means  disobeying  his  or  her  direct  orders.  
Noncompliance is acceptable if it is followed by victory, and victory is necessitated upon 
the foreknowledge that can only be derived from the use of spies. As the author(s) of 
chapter 13 make clear, paying for and wisely utilizing secret intelligence is part of the 
general’s  service  to  the  ruler  and  to  the  people  (ibid.  129).  Still,  this  is  not  the  limit  of  a  
general’s mandate, according to the Sun Zi. Part of the ‘protective services’ the general 
provides is the proper management of the military during wartime which, if poorly 
managed or the war is protracted, taxes the resources—human, material, and fiscal—of the 
populace at large (this is the main thrust of chapter 2). Thus, a competent general also 
‘protects’ the people from the incapacitating consequences of a prolonged and/or 
improperly managed war. Taken together, this sharpens my opening point that for the 
authors of the Sun Zi wartime suspends some important aspects of the ‘normal’ hierarchical 
order of the state, making the general the ultimate “arbiter of fate for the people” (ibid. 83) 
in place of, or, at least, side by side with, the sovereign. Analogically, if the sovereign is the 
capstone of the societal pyramid then, in times of war, the capstone is basically suspended 
above while the general’s is its highest tier.   
 So if Sun Zi’s general is situated within the confines of the traditional order of the 
military hierarchy and that of his society, what separates him from an unswervingly loyal 
military ‘bureaucrat’, i.e., a positionist general? It is the drive to win, for that is “[t]he 
purpose of engaging in battle” (ibid. 81). Even then, “being victorious a hundred times in a 
hundred battles is not the most excellent approach. Causing the enemy forces to submit 
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without a battle is the most excellent approach.” (ibid. 85, my italics). This is the logic of 
victory through and through. Sun Zi’s general is able to exchange the positionist rationality 
for  the  rationality  of  the  individualist  (and  vice  versa)  when  it  suits  his  goals.  It  is  this  
cultural logic that dictates when the traditional order should be upheld or not. Now, let us 
view this issue from another angle. 
 If we review the aforementioned results through the metaphor of ‘information 
control systems’ the way that Douglas and Mars (2003) do, we again find that both the 
individualist and positionist cultures can be seen in the text. This time around, the general is 
advised to be more positionist than individualist and even exhibit features of the fatalist as 
well. Here I follow the order of the chart in first discussing the source of the information, 
next, the way that the information is regulated, then, the quality of its meaning, and, finally, 
whether secrecy is utilized and to what degree. 
 From within an individualist culture, the ‘superstar’, that key figure in a social 
network, is the source of the information, whereas from a positionist culture I deduced that 
information is top-down (that is, from the upper tiers) and tradition-based, which I believe 
is  in  line  with  previous  theorizing  in  CT.  As  we read  in  chapter  1  of  the  Art of War, the 
general must have a sufficient amount of knowledge (of the socio-political unity between 
the ruler and the people, of the weather and terrain75, of the capability of the opposing 
general, of the strength of the army, and so on) in order to make the initial assessments to 
decide whether he will emerge victorious from engaging in battle or not. While it is so that 
he gains foreknowledge through the use of his spies (chapter 13), he is the ‘superstar’ that 
generates the information. It should be noted that the type of information that the general 
receives  and  transmits  is  not  based  on  past  experience  or  custom  (like  the  positionist  
culture) nor is it subject to fashions (like the individualist culture), at least, not ideally. 
Instead, it comes from the ‘man (or woman) on the ground’, but because “[w]arfare is a 
way of deception” the possibility of the general receiving misinformation and/or 
disinformation is ever-present. Still, being that the general is the highest tier of the military 
hierarchy, the information, corrupted or otherwise, travels from him down to the other tiers. 
The information is not transmitted in the same form that the general received it, though. It 
                                               
75  This  is  a  positionist  view  of  nature,  whether  in  the  form  of  weather  or  terrain,  for  it  is  knowable,  
predictable, for the most part, and, thus, useful against the enemy. 
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must first be censored and apportioned, by him, according to the prescribed roles of his 
officers and other soldiers. They are, as it is said, on a ‘need-to-know basis’. Regardless of 
whether they understand the deeper significance of their orders or not, they must follow 
them. This form of information regulation is very much in line with the positionist 
‘information control system’. Within the individualist culture while the ‘superstar’ stores 
information to be apportioned ‘strategically’, seemingly like the general does, censorship is 
frowned upon; anyone could, technically, have access to the same information, in one way 
or another. These are not the same kinds of social control. What can be said about the 
quality of the information being transmitted?  
 In terms of the quality of the information’s meaning, the Sun Zi advocates different 
degrees of ambiguity for different purposes. For positionists information should contain 
‘minimum ambiguity’. Every person should clearly understand the information they are 
allotted them so as to function within their social roles. For individualists I deduced that the 
information could contain ‘moderate ambiguity’ or just enough ambiguity to keep people 
talking or writing about the ‘superstar’, thereby keeping his or her node glowing at the 
center of the network. For fatalists I deduced that the information would contain ‘maximum 
ambiguity’ like the enclavists, but instead of using the ambiguity for consensus and 
cohesion like the enclavists do, ambiguity is used by those that regulate the information to 
prolong  the  fatalists’  dissensus  and  disarray.  The  quality  of  meaning  that  the  general  
generates should conceivably be, in turns, of minimal, moderate, and maximal ambiguity. 
That is not what the Sun Zi explicitly advances. Neither “deeply planted spies” nor even the 
“masses” (both civilians and military personnel) should know how a general “produce[s] 
victory…a body of soldiers has no constant configuration; a body of water has no constant 
form.”  In  other  words,  they  should  be  ‘formless’,  their  shape,  ambiguous  so  as  to  strike  
organically at the ‘empty’ points of an enemy’s form. (Sun Zi trans. Mair 2007:99). When 
it comes to the quality of the meaning of the information, maximum ambiguity, an 
ostensibly fatalist cultural logic, is openly advocated. For the authors of the Sun Zi it  may 
be obvious that minimum ambiguity is required if the officers and soldiers are to perform 
their tasks properly and, perhaps, that is why they do not explicitly mention it. In a military 
context, ambiguity is intimately connected with secrecy. 
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 For positionists secrecy is used for control, while for individualists secrecy is 
criticized as censorship is and for basically the same reasons—everyone should have access 
to as much information as possible in order to get a chance to compete. I think that while 
secrecy may be disapproved of ‘officially’ by individualist culture, pragmatically, it is too 
useful to dispense with. Plus, any effective storing up of information to be utilized later, as 
the individualist superstar does, requires security measures that necessarily entail secrecy. 
Herein lies a potential gap in the theorizing on ‘information control systems’. For the Art of 
War, the general should be unabashedly positionist in terms of using secrecy for control—
control  over  the  general’s  own army (e.g.  ibid.  121)  as  well  as  control  over  his  enemy’s.  
The general is “[s]ubtle… insubstantial…inaudible, [for] the expert leaves no trace…” (Sun 
Zi trans.  Griffith 1963:97).  Overall,  while the ‘information control  system’ that  the Art of 
War promotes is mostly of a positionist persuasion with hints of the fatalist, one must not 
forget that they are necessarily nested within an individualist culture.  
 Throughout the Art of War runs a cord of rationality, double-braided. In practice it 
manifests by means of exploiting the conventional in conjunction with the unconventional 
in order to manipulate the enemy (see chapters 5 and 6, specifically). This I would argue is 
the hallmark of the Art of War, for it is by the collaboration of the unconventional and the 
conventional that “‘[v]ictory…can be created’” (Sun Zi trans. Mair 2007:98, my italics). 
The supporting examples taken from the text come from chapters written and compiled by 
different authors at different times, yet, socioculturally, their message is cohesive. Cultural 
theoretically, then, the Sun Zi argues that a general should be an amalgam of a 
‘manipulative collectivist’ (positionist) way of life and a ‘manipulative individualist’ 
(individualist) way of life for the intention of becoming a potent manipulator who, through 
deft manipulations, can achieve total victory.  
The results of a sociological reading of the Art of War are meant to be more 
suggestive than anything else. I made a number of unconventional moves to reach this 
point. As I stated in the ‘Structure’ subsection (2.2), Mills’ ‘intellectual craftsmanship’ is 
rarely, if ever, used as a ‘methodology’. Although if one goes by Silverman’s (2001:4) 
basic definition of methodology as a way of “go[ing] about studying a phenomenon”, then 
it should qualify because that it exactly how I went about studying the phenomenon of 
‘culture’ in the Sun Zi. While my ‘data’ is text-based I do not use any qualitative methods 
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to speak of or any formal methods, for that matter. The intention was to employ Mills’ 
methodological tools to help amplify my ‘unfettered thought’ as the ‘method’. Furthermore, 
my data is a singular text (usually not standard practice for an empirical study), though, I 
suppose, it could be argued that I investigate the Art of War as a sort of Foucauldian 
‘master narrative’ without Foucault’s theoretical tools. With that said, if someone were to 
‘replicate’ my study by following the route I described in the beginning of this section I 
believe they might come close to my general findings. The question, then, becomes how 
reliable  were  the  deductions  I  made  to  fill  the  gaps  of  information  in  the  chart  that  I  
compiled. Verifying those deductions would basically require a study of its own or, at least, 
more space than is permitted in this paper but then that would also miss the point of using 
the chart heuristically. Finally, the question remains of whether one would be able to reach 
similar results through more conventional means. This is a valid question, but that would 
defeat the purpose. All in all, I find that unconventional means can produce results, and 
they should not get short shrift. 
6 Discussion  
6.1 Methodological and theoretical contributions 
 I address the methodological and theoretical contributions in previous sections so I 
will just reiterate them briefly here. In terms of methodological contributions, I attempt to 
explicate the logical underpinning of C. Wright Mills’ ‘intellectual craftsmanship’, add to 
its creative tools, and actually utilize it methodologically in answering my research 
questions. I attempt to demonstrate that unconventional means, whether in the form of the 
arrangement of a research paper, the choices of one’s research methodology, the type of 
data, to the choice of method, or lack thereof, can be productive within the context of a 
research paper.  
 In terms of theoretical contributions there are three main parts. First, I attempt to 
extend the applicability of Cultural Theory by demonstrating its utility in analyzing an 
ancient Chinese text. While I only hint at how surprise in abductive reasoning could be 
socioculturally grounded in CT’s theory of surprise, I have a strong intuition that this could 
be profitable avenue of research. Furthermore, they could be combined with the study of 
other topics I touched on like deception, another concept that gets scant sociological 
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treatment. Second, I attempt to add something to current Sun Zi scholarship by proposing 
that the work is made up of basically two competing ways of life that are, for the most part, 
in a form of equilibrium so as to advance an integrated message about how a general might 
better emerge victorious in battle. Third, I attempt to read Cultural Theory through the Art 
of War and utilize it strategically below.  
6.2 Strategic issues 
 Here I provide a sketch of how Cultural Theory could be read through the Art of 
War and applied to strategic ends. Since, as Sun Zi counsels, in warfare, whether one fights 
or does not fight, the goal is to win, the most interesting question to me refers back to the 
title of this research paper—how might one use cultural biases to win? As the Sun Zi 
advises one must know one’s opponent and know one’s self. As far as knowing one’s 
opponent, this requires high-quality information gathering of some sort. Once the 
information, gaps and all, is at hand, CT essentially becomes a frame for reading the 
information and a heuristic device for discovering the overall way an opponent thinks 
grounded in his or her way of life as well as the weak points that inevitably come with it. 
Since there are only four or five cultures and only so many alliances that they can form 
together, this considerably narrows down the possible strategic choices one’s opponent 
could make. Granted, this would necessarily entail a reduction of complexity, but it would 
also entail an increase in expeditious decision-making about one’s opponent’s choices with 
the intention of taking action, effectively, ‘beating them to the punch’.  
 CT can also be a used in a reflexive manner to ‘know one’s self’ by helping to 
discover what cultural biases one might have. This is somewhat akin to Nowacki’s 
(2004:337 italics in original) sixth ‘philosophical’ culture whose “[c]ritical rationality...is 
willing to put all of its principles and presuppositions into question” in order to attain truth. 
One must be severe with one’s own cultural biases for three main reasons. The first reason 
for being severe with one’s cultural biases is related to the weak points that inevitably come 
with a certain way of perceiving reality which, is at the same time, a way of not perceiving 
reality. One’s weak points need to be found and fortified, for a clever opponent will 
eventually strike there if and when they want to win. The second reason for being severe 
with one’s cultural biases is related to knowing one’s self, for in doing so one can avoid 
deceiving oneself which makes getting deceived by one’s opponent that much easier. The 
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third reason is related to knowing one’s opponent. One should attempt to know one’s 
opponent as they ‘are’ not as they are perceived through one’s culture; in this way, one can 
be better equipped to deceive them. Being severe with ones’ cultural biases is an absolute 
necessity. One must always keep in mind that “warfare is a way of deception”.  
 In the Sun Zi ‘deception’ is not synonymous with lying as might be supposed. As 
professor of international relations and Chinese history Arthur Waldron points out, 
deception (gui dao ? ?, literally “deception way”) in the Sun Zi is more than just military 
trickery. It means “to subvert the foundation upon which all society and human activity is 
believed, by Chinese philosophers, to rest” (Waldron foreward in Mair 2007:xix); this 
‘foundation’ is the dao or ‘moral way’. For Sun Zi, the dao is “that which causes the people 
to be of the same mind with their superior. Therefore, [t]hey are committed to die with him, 
[t]hey are committed to live with him and not fear danger” (trans. Mair 2007:77). As a 
result, for Waldron, deception in the ancient Chinese way of thinking is “far more grave 
and potentially far more powerful than any mere ‘deception’ would be in the west” 
(foreward in Mair 2007:xix). Although Waldron may be overstating this distinction 
between ‘East’ and ‘West’76, I do not think he is overstating the potentiality of the Art of 
War. From my point of view, deception in the Sun Zi is no less than the manipulation or 
fabrication77 of sociocultural reality itself, the very subject matter of Cultural Theory.  
 How then can one use CT to deceive an opponent and get closer to victory? 
According to CT, individuals are “self-contained regime[s]” made up of alliances of 
cultures (Thompson et al. 1990:265–67). So even while one culture overrules the others, 
one already has the cultural ‘infrastructure’ to build upon. CT already provides readymade 
designs for what these cultures include. So, then, it just becomes a process of consciously 
learning and internalizing all of their forms of rationality so that one accentuate, down play, 
or mix this or that culture as the circumstances require. One then takes on a protean persona 
                                               
76 The “stratagemic doctrine” military doctrine of the ancient Greeks and Romans, which consists of 
planning, foresight, timing and the general’s “instant analysis” or anchinoia (Greek for “quickness of 
thought”), later called coup d’oeil (French for “at a glance”), comes closer to what Sun Zi and other like-
minded ancient Chinese military theorists as well as the ancient Indian kingmaker and ‘political scientist’ 
Kautilya advocate than what is commonly known as ‘deception’ in English today (Mair 2007:42-46; Wheeler 
1988:23, 29; Wheeler 2003:1-6). In addition, Barton Whaley’s (1982:182) academic perspective on military 
deception as the “distortion of perceived reality” fits, for the most part, with what Sun Zi advances. 
77 Military historian Joseph Caddell makes the following distinction between a fabrication and a 
manipulation: fabrications are false information presented as true while manipulations are the use of true 
information presented out of context to create a false impression (2004:1). 
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(a possible seventh culture?). One could take on an opponent’s culture, mirroring them for 
the purposes of lulling them with what they take for granted or infuriating them. One could 
play the part of the ‘fatalist’, society’s underdog, thereby appearing incapable when one is 
capable, one of Sun Zi’s maxims and the classic ‘feign weakness’ stratagem. One could 
play the part of the ‘mad dog’, an extreme version of the fatalist, which worked for Hamlet 
and David in an episode before he became king and works for North Korea. Living as one’s 
opponent does can go to extremes in two main ways, though.  
 One may actually ‘become’ one’s opponent; in CT terms this essentially means that 
one accepts the other’s way of life as one’s own and exchanges cultures, consciously or 
unconsciously. One can also find that there are points of contact between oneself and one’s 
opponent wherein one discovers that one’s goals can be accomplished better through 
cooperation than competition. Transforming opponents into allies is definitely one way to 
win without fighting. Conflict can become concord and as long as one still emerges 
victorious that is the Art  of  War. While none of this information is necessarily new, the 
application of Cultural Theory as an approach to the ‘art of war’ in the spirit of the Sun Zi, 
especially in terms of making speedier, culturally-informed decisions, is novel and worthy 
of further study. 
6.3 Moral considerations 
 In this subsection I would like to address possible ethical issues that might arise 
from using Sun Zi’s Art of War and Cultural Theory for the purposes of deception as I have 
described above. To be clear, deception as the Sun Zi describes it is akin to the word 
‘stratagem’78. Some of the stratagems described in the previous section are based on 
deception, but not all stratagems are deceptive. They can include such things as bribery, the 
sophistical reading of documents, and treaties. (Wheeler 1988:21; 2003:1). Since ancient 
times,  stratagems, in all  their  diversity,  proliferated (and still  do) through oral  and written 
media as diverse as Biblical proverbs, Aesop’s fables, the ancient Chinese epic the 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms,  and so on. If  one takes the example of the Scriptures a 
distinction is made between lying and bearing false witness, which are abhorred by God 
                                               
78 First used (for ‘military ploy’) in the late 15th century, from Middle French stratageme from Italian 
stratagemma via Latin strategema from Greek strat???ma ‘generalship’, from strat?gein ‘to be a general’, 
from strat?gos ‘a general’, from stratos ‘army’ + agein ‘to lead’ (adapted from Merriam-Webster and Oxford 
online dictionaries as well as freedictionary.com and thesaurus.com). 
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(e.g. Proverbs 6:16-19 New American Standard Bible), and stratagems which can be 
deceptive. Stratagems (called tahbulot in Hebrew) can and, it is strongly implied, should be 
learned by the ‘intelligent’ (ibid. Proverbs 1:5). These tahbulot are a “sophisticated level of 
knowledge...that can be put to any purpose, such as in waging war” and can be learned 
from the book of Proverbs (Fox 2000:37). Even studying cases, like the Israelite 
commander Joshua’s battle with the king of Ai (Joshua 8), can generate stratagems that can 
then be applied metonymically from the military domain to other social arenas as they have 
been in the past (Wheeler 1988:21). Some people today view deception as inherently 
immoral; others see the use of deception as not immoral but simply amoral. For certain 
ancients like Homer, Sun Zi, and Solomon the ability to devise and utilize stratagems, 
deceptive or otherwise, was closely related to wisdom and could also comprise foresight, 
timing, good fortune, finesse, discretion, discipline, indirection, ingenuity, credibility, 
speed, subtleness, benevolence, boldness, guesswork, versatility, vigilance, expedience, and 
the veteran’s experience. So instead of being fundamentally immoral, what designates the 
artful employment of stratagems, deceptive or otherwise, as either praise- or blame-worthy, 
moral or immoral is not that they are used but how they  are  used  and  to  what  ends.  
(Baumard [1996]2001:53-72; Chia and Holt 2010:192-197; Detienne and Vernant 1978:14; 
Fox 2000:30-38; Raphals 1992:224; Sun Zi trans Griffith 1963:65; Wheeler 1988:21, 109-
110). 
7 Conclusion 
The intersection of Sun Zi’s Art of War and Douglasian Cultural Theory has been 
an  opportunity  to  show  how  fruitful  the  coming  together  of  an  ancient,  Chinese  military  
treatise as data and a modern, ‘Western’ sociocultural theory can be. While at first glance 
they may appear to be somewhat of an antithetical pair, there are incremental steps 
connecting them as if on a continuum. Starting in the middle, where my reasoning resides, I 
employed heuristic devices to take abductive leaps from one step to the next. At one end of 
the continuum, I gave a sociocultural reading of the Art of War and found that the Art  of  
War is made up two competing cultures forged together for victory. Then, I turned around 
and took more abductive leaps toward the other end of the continuum and gave a Sun Zi-
inspired reading of Cultural Theory. I found that Cultural Theory can be used to know the 
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one’s opponent and know one’s self, to avoid deception and to deceive. One could 
essentially exploit cultural biases to win without fighting.  
 
Generally speaking, “[i]t  is  common to join battle with conventional tactics and to 
achieve victory though unconventional tactics” (Sun Zi trans. Mair 2007:92).  
 
I hope that this research paper has been both interesting and advantageous for the 
sociologist, the cultural theorist, the scholar and the practitioner of the Sun Zi alike. 
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